The Effect of Nephrologist Intervention in Chronic Kidney Disease Patients on Queensland Public Hospital Separations and Expenditure by Duncan, Sally
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Business, Economics & Law 
School of Economics 
 
The Effect of Nephrologist Intervention in 
Chronic Kidney Disease Patients on Queensland 
Public Hospital Separations and Expenditure 
An Honours Thesis submitted to the School of Economics, The University of 
Queensland, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
BAFE(Honours) 
 
By: 
Sally Duncan 
 Bachelor of Advanced Finance and Economics (Economics Major) 
 
Supervisor: 
Dr Marcin Sowa 
 
October 25, 2019 
 
Approximate Word Length: 18 000 
 
1 
 
Declaration Statement 
 
 
I declare that the work presented in this Honours thesis is, to the best of my knowledge 
and belief, original and my own work, except as acknowledged in the text, and that 
material has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any 
other university. 
 
…………………………………  
Sally Duncan 
 25 October 2019 
 
  
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, thank you to my supervisor Dr Marcin Sowa for taking me on as a 
research assistant in 2017, and then again as an honours student in 2019. I truly 
appreciate the chance to apply the skills I’ve learned to the issue of chronic kidney 
disease, where health economists have such a large opportunity to make a difference. 
Thank you to my family who have been a constant source of support over the past year as 
I’ve undertaken this challenge.  
Thank you to Dr Christiern Rose and Dr Fu Ouyang for your econometric advice on 
particular issues. It was greatly appreciated.  
Finally – to the Honours 2019 cohort. Thank you for the best possible version of this 
character-building year! I couldn’t have asked for a more lovely, funny and smart group of 
people to learn from and spend the year with.  
 
Ethical exemption has been obtained for application #2019002122 
   
3 
 
Abstract 
Chronic kidney disease is a costly burden to the Australian health system, particularly as it 
relates to the risk of progression to end-stage renal disease. Select public hospitals in 
Queensland offer outpatient nephrology clinics, which require referral to attend but are 
free-of-charge to the public.  The CKD.QLD Registry is a surveillance program of chronic 
kidney disease which enrols consenting patients who present to these clinics. Through a 
data-linkage relationship with Queensland Health, a panel dataset was generated which 
detailed all-cause separation and expenditure information for CKD patients initially 
referred to the Mackay clinic between July 2012 and June 2015.  The timeframe of analysis 
was one year before and after nephrologist intervention, divided into eight 3-monthly 
quarters. The aim of this thesis was to explore both the effect of nephrologist intervention 
on the odds of at least one separation in a given quarter, and whether nephrologist 
intervention lowered all-cause inpatient expenditure. The traditional two-part model of 
healthcare expenditure analysis was adapted for use with a panel dataset to answer these 
questions. 
The results showed that all-cause separation was an uncommon event for CKD patients in 
the year before and after nephrologist intervention, which hindered the ability to draw 
conclusions regarding the effect of nephrologist intervention. Both random and fixed 
effects logit models estimated increasing odds of at least one separation in the quarters 
leading up to nephrologist intervention. However, only the random effects model 
estimated two non-consecutive quarters in the post-intervention year in which a 
statistically significant reduction in odds occurred, relative to the odds in the quarter 
before the intervention. The pooled OLS model selected for analysis of conditional 
expenditure estimated only one quarter in the post-intervention year with a significant 
reduction in log-transformed expenditure, relative to expenditure in the quarter before 
nephrologist intervention.  The addition of repeated measures of time-varying clinical 
values to chronic kidney disease surveillance datasets (for example eGFR and HbA1c) 
would allow health economists to use within variation of comorbidity regressors to 
expand the range of model specifications and econometric methods able to be employed 
in future analysis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
Australia’s explicit commitment to provide universal health care to its citizens is a 
significant expression of cultural values and an increasingly difficult promise to deliver. 
The allocation of resources both within the health system and between health and other 
sectors of the economy is an issue gaining national attention, due to increases in 
healthcare spending over the last decade. In particular, health expenditure as a function of 
GDP has risen from 8.7% in 2006-07 to 10.3% in 2015-16 (AIHW 2018). While economists 
have noted Australia’s small GDP growth during this time as an attributable factor (Davey 
2017), the increase has still generated significant discussion with regards to the 
sustainability of the current budget path without either future spending cuts or taxation 
increases.  
There are clear contributions for health economists to make in this area. Firstly, given the 
increasing amount of health care data collected, it is important to catalogue and project 
health care expenditure for common disease states. In this way, both government and 
non-government sectors are able to plan spending in advance and recognise growing 
burdens that require intervention. Secondly, where treatment advances or alternative 
therapeutic options become available for particular disease states, a clear understanding 
of baseline expenditure allows the government and medical professionals to weigh 
improvements in the quality of disease management against the changes in expenditure 
which would be involved (Honeycutt et al. 2013). 
Few disease states are more in need of close scrutiny by health economists than chronic 
kidney disease (hereafter referred to as CKD). This is due to three exacerbating factors, 
outlined below. 
1.1.1 Population at Risk 
In the most recent 2017-18 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) National Health Survey of 
approximately 21 000 Australians, 1% self-reported having kidney disease - a slight 
increase from 0.8% when the question was asked in 2011-12 (ABS 2018). However in 
2011-12, the ABS also collected biomedical data for the first time – which allowed for a 
broad comparison of the gap between self-reported disease rates and their underlying 
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prevalence. From this, the ABS found 10% of adults had at least one clinical sign of CKD, 
with slightly over half classed as Stage 1 or 2 (ABS 2013). The results were markedly worse 
for Indigenous adults, for whom 22% displayed signs indicative of CKD (AIHW 2017). While 
these results should be interpreted within the context that it takes repeated testing over a 
3 month period to differentiate CKD from other causes (Kidney Health Australia 2015), it is 
striking to note the number of Australians who may be unaware that they are in the early 
stages of the disease.  
1.1.2 End Stage Renal Disease Costs 
CKD can progress to end stage renal disease (ESRD). At this point, treatment options 
include dialysis or a kidney transplant, unless the patient chooses to conservatively 
manage their symptoms as a palliative alternative.  In 2015-16, 13% of hospitalisations 
were for dialysis as a principal diagnosis1, making it the most frequent cause of 
hospitalisation in the country (AIHW 2017). The prevalence of patients undergoing dialysis 
in Australia has also strictly increased between 1998 and 2017, from 298 patients per 
million to 531 (ANZDATA Registry 2018). In Queensland, this translates to 2,524 patients in 
2017 (ANZDATA Registry 2018). There have been few major institutional Australian costing 
studies of dialysis in the last decade2, and results vary considerably as the scope of 
included costs widen to cover primary/allied health care and pharmaceuticals.  However 
Queensland Health’s (QH) own modelling showed annual per patient costs of ($AUD2005) 
$89,786 for hospital haemodialysis, $52,557 for satellite centre haemodialysis, $48,333 for 
home haemodialysis and $57,893 for peritoneal dialysis (Queensland Government 2007). 
Each modality also has initial access costs in the range of $10,000 -$15,000 (Queensland 
Government 2007).  One of the key results of the landmark 2010 IDEAL study was to show 
that early initiation of dialysis once a patient reaches Stage 5 CKD is not associated with 
prolonged life, a better quality of life or fewer cardiovascular events (Cooper et. al 2010). 
Thus, there is a clear role for economic analysis regarding cost-effective clinical 
management of CKD in order to ensure that ESRD costs are allocated appropriately. 
                                                        
1 A principal diagnosis is ‘the diagnosis established after study to be chiefly responsible for occasioning an 
episode of admitted patient care’ (AIHW 2019a). 
2 See NSW Dialysis Costing Study (2008) and Queensland Health Renal Replacement Therapy Costing Study 
(2008).  
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1.1.3 Workforce Planning  
One of the ways in which the clinical management of CKD patients can be altered is via 
referral to a nephrologist. If the referral is directed towards a public hospital that provides 
an outpatient nephrology service, this represents an allocation of government 
expenditure which warrants attention from health economists. However state healthcare 
systems also exert significant power with regards to the training and employment 
opportunities for the nephrology profession. Consequently, research undertaken to 
determine the impact of nephrologist intervention on hospital separation and expenditure 
patterns in CKD patients may also influence judgements made regarding appropriate 
hospital staffing levels.  
The supply of nephrologists needs to be managed carefully, given the time and resources 
required to train them, and thus the lag time inherent in adjusting supply to changes in 
demand. Junior doctors need to undertake three years of the Royal Australasian College of 
Physicians Basic Training Program before they can complete the three-year Advanced 
Training in Nephrology (RACP 2017; RACP 2019). QH offers a restricted number of places 
each year for nephrology training (Queensland Health 2019b). In 2017, the Australian and 
New Zealand Society of Nephrology released a report which noted a large increase in 
supply of nephrology trainees and nephrologists, as a downstream effect of federal 
government intervention over the past twenty years which tripled the number of medical 
places at universities (ANZSN 2017).  This has been accompanied by concerns about the 
capacity for supervision as well as trainees lacking exposure to a broad range of clinical 
experiences (ANZSN 2017). One of the key messages from the report was that ‘the 
situation has changed from undersupply to apparent oversupply’ (ANZSN 2017, p.19). It is 
vital to understand the impact of nephrologist care on the separation and expenditure 
patterns associated with CKD patients, as this information flows through to the 
construction of referral guidelines that medical professionals use to initiate nephrologist 
care. In the event of research which suggests an increased role for nephrologists, there are 
limited mechanisms for supply to adjust quickly in this market.  
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF INTEREST 
A review of the theoretical economic motivations of the main market actors was 
conducted, alongside a review of the empirical literature associated with this topic.  From 
this process, three research questions of interest were generated. 
1) Are patients separated3 from hospital less frequently as a result of nephrologist 
care? 
2) Is all-cause inpatient expenditure lower as a result of nephrologist care? 
3) Are statistically significant relationships able to be established regarding the 
interaction between CKD and comorbidities, with respect to their impact on 
separation and expenditure patterns? 
If nephrologist intervention is found to reduce all-cause separations and hospital 
expenditure, this information is a valuable addition to medical research regarding the 
clinical outcomes of patients under nephrologist treatment. There are two major potential 
policy impacts of this research. Firstly, as previously noted the staffing levels of public 
nephrologists in QH is a determination of the state government. Therefore, research 
which suggests a potential cost saving for the health system may support increased 
staffing levels in the future. Secondly, given patients are referred to public outpatient 
nephrology services on the basis of referral criteria, information regarding the potential 
cost saving to the health system may provide a valuable service to the professional 
organisations that produce referral guidelines. 
1.3 CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis uses a QH dataset to examine the separation and expenditure patterns of 273 
CKD patients, in the context of their referral to the Mackay outpatient nephrology clinic. A 
novel strategy is employed of adapting the traditional two-part model of healthcare 
expenditure analysis to a panel dataset. This involved the estimation of pooled, random 
effects and fixed effects logit models in the first part, followed by a conditional 
expenditure estimation using pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects linear models.  
The potential for endogeneity issues in research of this type is explored. A theoretical 
                                                        
3 A separation may be statistical in nature (where the type of care changes – for example acute care to 
palliative care) or formal (e.g. discharge or death) (Queensland Health 2015a; Independent Hospital Pricing 
Authority 2015). 
12 
 
description of the economic motivations of the main actors in the market for outpatient 
nephrologist consultations in Queensland is also developed. Recommendations are 
presented for data collection methods which would aid econometric analysis of this type 
in the future. 
1.4 OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the role of the kidneys and a description of CKD. It 
is intended to provide contextual information for readers with a non-health background to 
aid their understanding throughout the remaining chapters. Chapter 3 outlines a 
theoretical description of the economic motivations of the main actors in the Queensland 
outpatient nephrology consultation market. This is used in conjunction with an empirical 
literature review in Chapter 4 to inform the research questions of interest. Chapter 5 
discusses the QH – CKD.QLD Registry dataset utilised for analysis. Chapter 6 outlines the 
econometric methods used to test the dependent variables under analysis, as well as 
presenting descriptive statistics. Results and discussion for each dependent variable are 
presented in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. Concluding remarks are made in Chapter 9.  
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2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION – CHRONIC KIDNEY DISEASE 
It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full description of the kidneys’ role in 
physiological homeostasis or a pathophysiological account of CKD and its complex 
interactions with other acute and chronic disease states. However, to aid understanding of 
the issues discussed (including the variables chosen for econometric analysis), a selection 
of information is provided below for context. 
2.1 THE ROLE OF THE KIDNEYS 
The most commonly understood role of the kidneys is to filter blood to remove metabolic 
waste, drugs and toxins from the body through the production of urine (Marieb & Hoehn 
2018). However the kidneys are involved in many more critical functions, including 
(Marieb & Hoehn 2018); 
 the adjustment of blood volume and it’s composition – which also contributes to the 
body’s internal pH regulation 
 synthesis of erythropoietin (involved in red blood cell production) and renin (a 
critical component of the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system of internal blood 
pressure regulation). 
One of the key markers of kidney function is glomerular filtration rate (GFR) which 
measures the initial filtrate volume made per minute. This can be estimated in practice 
(known as eGFR) through formulae such as the Modification of Diet in Renal Disease 
(MDRD) or CKD-EPI.  A decline in eGFR is one of the symptoms used to stage CKD. A 
second symptom which may indicate ill health is the presence of large quantities of 
proteins including albumin in the urine – known as proteinuria and albuminuria. 
2.2 CHRONIC KIDNEY DISEASE 
CKD is generally characterised as the progressive loss of kidney function, with a most 
common underlying cause being diabetes (KHA 2015; Marieb & Hoehn 2018). The 
definition has evolved in recent years due to advances in the understanding of the 
relationship between different clinical indicators of kidney dysfunction and subsequent 
morbidity and mortality. As described by Johnson et al.;  
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Large population studies have consistently shown that albuminuria and proteinuria 
strongly and independently predict the risks of CKD progression, cardiovascular disease 
and all-cause mortality in both diabetic and non-diabetic individuals. Moreover, 
combining albuminuria measurement with eGFR provides synergistic, complementary 
risk stratification for both cardiovascular disease and CKD. (Johnson et al. 2012, p. 1) 
The staging of CKD reflects this nuance, as well as the fact that abnormal results need to 
be consistently displayed for > 3 months to rule out transient causes and to differentiate 
the CKD patient from those experiencing acute kidney injury – who will show a rapid but 
typically reversible decline in eGFR (KHA 2015). An excerpt of the diagnostic algorithm 
from Kidney Health Australia’s ‘Chronic Kidney Disease (CKD) Management in General 
Practice’ is provided below in Figure 1, and in Appendix 1.  
 
Figure 1 Staging of Chronic Kidney Disease (KHA 2015) 
It is important to note that CKD is commonly asymptomatic, and when symptoms do occur 
they may be non-specific such as fatigue and hypertension (KHA 2015). Adding to the 
challenge, by the time these symptoms are experienced it is possible that the patient’s 
kidney function has already declined by 90% (KHA 2015). 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR OUTPATIENT 
NEPHROLOGIST CONSULTATIONS 
In order to understand the economic actions of CKD patients and public nephrologists, it is 
important to outline the microeconomic foundations of the outpatient nephrologist 
consultation market. In particular, it is necessary to acknowledge the significant 
departures from traditional competitive market assumptions. Competitive market 
assumptions underlie the First Welfare Theorem, which posits that profit-maximising firms 
and welfare-maximising consumers whose preferences are locally non-satiating will trade 
within a feasible consumption set (given a price vector that clears all markets and that all 
market participants take as given) until a Pareto optimum is reached (Jehle & Reny 2011). 
In this equilibrium, allocations cannot be redistributed to make any consumer better off 
without making another consumer worse off. Acknowledging the insufficiency of this 
description to accurately portray the market under examination is necessary to develop a 
clear picture of why referral guidelines profoundly shape the actions of market actors. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates the centrality of government intervention in this market. 
3.1 THE COMMODITY OF ‘GOOD HEALTH’ 
In his seminal 1972 paper ‘On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health’, 
Michael Grossman’s model distinguishes between an internally-generated commodity of 
‘good health’ and the purchase of medical goods and services in support of this process. 
The Grossman model posits that health has the ability to directly influence utility by its 
presence in the utility function (mimicking a consumption good), as well as alter a person’s 
time constraint to increase time available for leisure and/or wage labour (functioning as 
an investment good). Consequently, the demand for health services is a derived demand 
(Marshall 2013), and medical goods and health services are jointly demanded in the 
pursuit of ‘good health’.  It is important to state explicitly – the questions explored in this 
thesis do not directly or indirectly constitute a judgement on the quality of care received 
by patients under the care of a nephrologist. Changes in the commodity of ‘good health’ 
are not observed within the QH-CKD.QLD Registry dataset; patients’ demographic and 
health status variables are fixed at consent. Rather, the dataset catalogues derived 
demand of Registry patients for all-cause inpatient hospital care.   
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3.2 THE MARKET GOOD – OUTPATIENT NEPHROLOGIST CONSULTATIONS IN THE 
PUBLIC SYSTEM 
Outpatient nephrologist consultations to public patients in public hospitals are free of 
charge.4 The quantity of outpatient appointments available is inherently limited via time 
constraints on the nephrologist/s, therefore access is rationed via a referral process.  
Wright et al. (2018) found the most common pathway for referral was through a GP, 
though patients may be referred as a consequence of an inpatient admission or via 
another specialist. There are more than one set of referral guidelines featuring slight 
differences (e.g. ‘Chronic Kidney Disease Management in General Practice’ and ‘KHA-
CARI’)5, and Australian research has found that approximately 30-40% of referrals do not 
meet the baseline criteria for referral – indicating scope for improvement (Lane et al. 
2016; Wright et al. 2018).  
Escalation of treatment from a GP to a nephrologist aims to use the medical information 
that a nephrologist possesses to overcome uncertainty (Arrow 1963) in the correct clinical 
course of action. Common clinical tasks that a nephrologist has specialised expertise in 
include; 
 Screening patients for the underlying aetiology of their CKD (e.g. diabetic 
nephropathy, renal artery stenosis) 
 Treating symptoms such as malnourishment and electrolyte disturbances 
 Altering medications for hypertension and diabetes 
 Commencement of medications for calcium/phosphate/vitamin D homeostasis 
(calcium supplements, phosphate binders) and erythropoiesis-stimulating agents 
for anaemia 
 Diagnostic tests such as electrocardiograms and angiograms for cardiovascular 
disease as well as kidney, ureter and bladder ultrasounds 
 Undertaking pre-ESRD counselling of patients with respect to dialysis initiation, 
transplant assessment or the decision to undertake conservative management 
                                                        
4 Clause G19 of the National Health Reform Agreement 2011 (Council of Australian Governments 2011) 
5 KHA-CARI referral guidelines can be found at: 
http://www.cari.org.au/CKD/CKD%20early/When_Refer_Spec_Renal_Care.pdf.  
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It should be noted here that CKD impacts a variety of bodily systems – thus this thesis will 
use all-cause separations and expenditure as its focus. 
3.3 CONSUMER PREFERENCES 
Attempting to place the patient-doctor relationship within the framework of a consumer-
firm market dynamic has immediate challenges. A marketplace of perfect competition 
entails consumers purchasing a homogenous good to the point where marginal utility is 
equal to marginal cost, and firms supplying goods until price equals marginal cost. 
Crucially, these decisions are independent of one another and the equilibrium is 
considered socially efficient as it maximises consumer surplus.  In contrast, medical 
services are individualised (Gaynor 1994) and subject to irregular patterns of demand 
(Arrow 1963). More consequentially, Arrow (1963) highlights the intrinsic uncertainty 
contained in this market; consumers cannot easily judge the correct course of action and 
neither patients nor doctors can reliably predict the relationship between medical care 
and the commodity of ‘good health’.  Multiple strands of economic theory can be used to 
critique the notion of consumers and firms acting independently in this environment, 
most notably through principal-agent theory. 
The doctor-patient relationship is commonly analysed through the lens of a principal-
agent interaction (Arrow 1963; Arrow 1985; McGuire 2000; Gafni et al. 1998; Blomqvist 
1991) in which the doctor functions as an agent representing the patient’s interests in the 
sphere of medical decision-making.  This relationship exists due to fundamental 
asymmetries of information with regards to diagnosis, the distribution of treatment 
options and the quality of the doctor’s execution of the ‘best’ course of action (Arrow 
1963). In the case under analysis in this thesis, the situation could be described as a single-
principal multiple-agent problem (Arrow 1985), as analysis will be of all-cause separation 
and expenditure. A patient’s health status will therefore be a reflection of the joint 
outcome produced by unobserved patient factors, the GP, nephrologist and other medical 
and allied health staff. However the nephrologist working for QH may also align with the 
Blomqvist (1991) description of a ‘double agent’; a person who is simultaneously working 
on behalf of the patient, however also incorporating a desire for system-wide cost 
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containment that is in the financial interest of their employer.6 Under the Blomqvist 
model, doctors will behave as perfect agents for their employer (rather than their patient) 
in equilibrium, unless legal liability is introduced for outcomes that are considered 
profoundly worse than expectations would predict. A market dynamic in which the firm 
determines consumer preferences to this extent is not unique to health care; common 
comparisons in the literature refer to car repair (McGuire 2000). However it is a clear 
violation of the competitive market assumptions stated in the beginning of this analysis.  
3.4 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
With respect to public patients and nephrologists – this thesis suggests that opportunities 
for profit maximisation are primarily resolved through the nephrologist’s remuneration 
agreement with their employer, rather than through marketplace interaction with a 
consumer. QH pays nephrologists a salaried wage, and as a result some of the common 
financing arrangements discussed in internationally-sourced literature (capitation, third-
party provider contracts) do not apply here.7 However patients admitted to a QH facility 
that elect to be treated as a private patient represent a separate market, and 
nephrologists with granted private practice agreements face a different set of financial 
incentives than they would treating public patients (Queensland Health 2019c).  Under the 
‘Revenue Assignment’ model (reported to be chosen by 86% of FTE senior medical officers 
in 2013), the nephrologist is paid a set allowance and contributes all fee-for-service (FFS) 
revenue to the respective Hospital and Health Service (HHS) (Queensland Audit Office 
2013). On the other hand, the ‘Revenue Retention’ model combines a smaller allowance 
with the ability to keep revenue earned up to a ceiling, after which revenue is shared 
between the nephrologist and the HHS in a 1:2 ratio (Queensland Health 2019c). The 
scope of this thesis is narrowed to public patients. Thus, it is not expected that 
nephrologists will engage in profit-maximising behaviour through actions such as 
unnecessary planned inpatient procedures. 
The nephrologist-as-firm framework also invites a consideration of market power. As 
stated in Section 1.1.3, QH restricts access to the Advanced Training pathway, and this is a 
                                                        
6 Blomqvist (1991) specifically describes this term in the context of a Health Maintenance Organisation, 
where a doctor is an employee drawing a salary.  
7 QH wage rates for FY19-FY21 are publicly available. See: 
https://www.health.qld.gov.au/hrpolicies/wage_rates/medical.  
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core component of the accreditation process that the Royal Australasian College of 
Physicians administers. Arrow (1963) observes that economic arguments for licensing 
commonly function to place a floor underneath quality, which in the case of medical 
specialists is valuable to consumers as they are unable to prospectively judge the quality 
of service.8 However, in a regional setting such as Mackay, if a situation arose in which 
patients were unhappy with their consultation, they would find it very difficult to switch 
nephrologists. Switching costs – in particular transaction costs - would be considerable 
(Klemperer 1987). The patient would likely be required to travel to a new location or 
purchase private health insurance to access choice via the private nephrologist market. As 
a result, the lack of substitute options to a public nephrologist may prevent consumers 
from switching doctors if they have a preference for increased consumption of medical 
services.  
3.5 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
Public hospital services including outpatient consultations are provided free to the 
consumer at the point of service, as they are funded through taxation. Part of the revenue 
source for public health care expenditure is the Medicare levy, set at 2% of taxable income 
(ATO 2019a). Reductions and exemptions may be sought for financial and/or medical 
circumstances.  A Medicare Levy Surcharge of 1-1.5% is additionally added to high-income 
earners who decline to purchase private health insurance (ATO 2019b). The crudely 
progressive nature of this system may reflect Arrow’s (1963) conjecture that people seek 
insurance against the effects of ill-health, and redistribution towards this aim is 
considered acceptable.  The government has a quantity-setting role in the number of 
outpatient nephrology consultations available by restricting the number of training places 
for prospective nephrologists and the employment levels of public nephrologists. A 
practical consequence of the quantity-setting power of the government is a reliance on 
referral criteria to effectively ration outpatient referrals. The government also has a price-
setting role in determining nephrologist remuneration for the public patient load and the 
absence of fees for public patients. For low-income earners, this may result in a reliance 
                                                        
8 Dranove and White (1987) argue that the referring GP’s play a key role in mediating the information 
asymmetry between the patient and nephrologist as they have a superior ability to judge quality compared 
to the consumer. Additionally, referrals with positive outcomes reflect on their own practice. However, in 
this circumstance, the fact that public patients do not have a choice of nephrologist limits the use of this 
argument in this context. 
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on outpatient nephrology clinics for specialist care. Moreover, in the event that a patient 
declines to purchase private health insurance and progresses to ESRD, the public health 
system will subsequently internalise the lifetime cost of a CKD patient through ESRD to 
death. Given ESRD which is not conservatively managed requires high-cost interventions 
such as transplantation and dialysis, the government has a clear incentive to seek out 
interventions in the CKD stage which will slow the patient’s progression to ESRD, and 
reduce the number of admissions which could have been avoided with better clinical 
management of CKD.  Outpatient nephrologist consultations therefore represent a 
reallocation of resources by the government to the current period in order to prevent 
costs incurred in future periods. Successful interventions in this manner represent a saving 
to the health system, which can then be redeployed to other areas. Here, it should be 
noted that a holistic determination of whether the intervention is cost-effective requires 
not only an analysis of costs incurred but also of patient health outcomes, reflecting the 
public’s dual role as both a taxpayer and patient. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This thesis proposes that in stark opposition to the assumptions of a competitive market, 
nephrologists have the power to exert significant influence over market outcomes through 
their role as an agent for the patient. A similarity exists between the Blomqvist notion of a 
double-agent and a nephrologist employed in the public system. Thus, the fact that the 
public health system internalises the lifetime costs of a public CKD patient motivates the 
nephrologist to seek out cost-effective treatment strategies. The government plays a 
quantity-setting role in the market by a determination of FTE nephrologist employment 
levels. It is also bears the majority of the burden of lifetime healthcare expenses for public 
CKD patients who progress to ESRD, motivating a desire for cost-effective treatment 
strategies. To the extent that consumer preferences are expressed in this market, they 
may be seen in the outcome of state elections in which public hospital funding is a key 
election issue.  Increases or declines in public hospital funding may directly impact the 
quantity of outpatient nephrologist consultations in the market, and therefore the 
importance of referral criteria.   
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4 LITERATURE REVIEW – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HOSPITALISATION 
EXPENDITURE IN CKD PATIENTS 
Dialysis costs (including those associated with attendant complications) have represented 
the major focus of economic literature to date, given the large burden it represents to the 
health care system. Far less attention has been paid to costs associated with pre-ESRD. 
The development of economic literature surrounding CKD has also occurred recently; 
international standardised guidelines for the definition and classification of CKD were only 
released in 2002, in the landmark National Kidney Foundation’s K/DOQI Clinical Practice 
Guidelines for Chronic Kidney Disease: Evaluation, Classification and Stratification.  Major 
studies in this area tend to be characterised by differing aims, diverse populations and 
multiple methods. Furthermore, findings need to be discussed with a note of caution that 
a paper’s country of origin may contribute significant unobserved heterogeneity with 
respect to the results reported relative to other economic disciplines. This is due to 
variations in the nature of care received in different health care systems, which may in 
turn be a function of access and cost of use for the patient.  
4.1 IMPACT OF NEPHROLOGIST REFERRAL ON RENAL OUTCOMES 
Within the sphere of medical literature, a number of papers have reviewed the impact of 
nephrologist referral on patient outcomes. Although health care expenditure is not an 
object of focus, a consideration of findings is helpful in establishing the causal impact of 
nephrologist care on patient health. Firstly, Jones et al. (2006) investigated the effect of 
referral to a nephrologist on the rate of eGFR decline and mortality in Stage 3-5 CKD 
patients in the United Kingdom (n=726).  Two significant results from this paper were that 
the median rate of eGFR decline fell by 5.05 mL/min/1.73m2/year to -0.35 
mL/min/1.73m2/year (p<0.001) once patients were under the care of a nephrologist. An 
eGFR decline of less than -1mL/min/1.73m2/year - considered non-progressive - was 
correlated with lower mortality after multivariate adjustment. In terms of the timeframe 
of treatment, although the paper did not detail the intensity of nephrologist appointments 
it is noted that the majority of medication management decisions and blood pressure 
reduction from baseline occurred within a year of referral.9 Similarly, Feest et al. (1999) 
                                                        
9 It is also posited that the arrest of eGFR decline occurs at approximately 9 months post-referral, though 
Jones et al. (2006) noted that this could not be determined directly. 
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studied a population of patients with diabetic nephropathy to analyse nephrologist 
intervention on eGFR decline. Although the sample size was limited (n=76), 39% of 
patients had statistically significant lowering of their renal function decline.  
A systematic review from Smart & Titus (2011) and a meta-analysis from Chan et al. (2007) 
both detailed differences in outcomes (mortality, initial hospitalisation) associated with 
early referral to a nephrologist compared to late referral.10 Importantly, Smart & Titus 
found the hospitalisation episode where dialysis was initiated was almost eight days 
shorter in the early-referral group11 (p=0.03) and improvements in mortality rates were 
sustained after five years (p<0.00001). Chan et al. (2007) also showed higher all-cause 
mortality with late referral, however the hospitalisation episode associated with dialysis 
introduction was shown to be twelve days longer (p=0.0007).  
4.2 IMPACT OF MULTI-DISCIPLINARY CARE ON COSTS AND RENAL OUTCOMES 
A number of countries have sought to implement models of care involving combinations 
of nephrologists, nurses and allied health staff with specialised knowledge in renal care in 
order to improve patient outcomes.  The majority of papers discussed in this section 
involve a control group receiving standard care for the particular geographical location, 
which allows statistically meaningful conclusions to be drawn regarding the effectiveness 
of the intervention. It also provides an ability to more easily compare results across 
countries.  
Harris et al. (1998) is notable for reporting no benefit for CKD patients from 
comprehensive multidisciplinary care. The paper discussed a two-year randomised 
controlled trial of 437 patients in Indiana, of which 231 were placed in the control arm of 
receiving primary care (though patients could be referred to the renal clinic if necessary). 
The intervention arm comprised a team of nephrologists, renal dieticians and nurses, as 
well as social workers. Nephrologist visits were scheduled every 3, 4 or 6 months 
depending on the severity of kidney disease, and clinical activities focussed on medication 
management and preventive care.  Data was also collected for years 3-5 to track post-
study outcomes. Results showed no statistically significant differences in renal function, 
                                                        
10 This nomenclature is used to describe the period between referral to a nephrologist and dialysis initiation.  
11 Early referral is inconsistently defined in the literature; Smart et al. (2011) specifies between 3-4 months 
before dialysis initiation for the figures above. 
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inpatient days or hospitalisations between the two groups across the timeframe 
examined. Moreover, the mortality rate was not statistically different between the two 
arms when adjusted for key variables (p=0.36). Annual costs were approximated at a 
minimum of $484 per patient.  Harris et al. discussed possible factors associated with this 
result - including that patient’s care was often optimised at the time of inclusion in the 
study, that nephrologist recommendations were still dependent on GP follow-through, 
and that the cases under study may not be severe enough to warrant this level of medical 
resources. It should be noted that the statistical analysis involved calculating strict p-value 
thresholds using Bonferroni’s correction, argued as necessary because multiple primary 
outcomes were explored.  
Hopkins et al. (2011) utilised the Canadian ‘CanPREVENT’ multicentre randomised 
controlled trial (n=474, intervention=238, control=236) to perform a cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) on a nephrologist-and-nurse care program versus usual care.12 The outcome 
studied was a delay or reduction in cardiovascular disease and ESRD. Care focussed on 
using medication to reach biomedical clinical targets, dietary modification and smoking 
cessation.  Appointments were conducted at a frequency of at least three times a year, 
and patients were given a Health Utility Index survey (HUI-3) periodically to approximate 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs).  The CEA timeframe of analysis was two years, and 
completed for costs specifically associated with renal and cardiovascular disease and again 
for all-cause costs. For both disease-related and all-cause criteria, the intervention arm did 
not have statistically different numbers of hospitalisations, but had fewer ICU days 
(p<0.01 under each criteria) and hospitalisation days (p<0.01 for all-cause, p=0.03 for 
disease-related). The intervention arm also recorded fewer all-cause tests, procedures and 
specialist visits (p<0.01). The annual costs attributed to each patient were ($CAN 2009) 
$466. Overall, although the intervention arm was considered dominant in both all-cause 
and disease-related states, only the all-cause model had statistically significant differences 
in costs (p=0.02).  
Chen et al. (2015) also studied a multidisciplinary team (nephrologists, pharmacists, 
dieticians and nurses) treating Taiwanese patients with Stage 3b-5 CKD, against a control 
group (n=1206, intervention=592, control=614). Outcomes under review included 
                                                        
12 59.7% of patients had cardiovascular disease, slightly under one-third were diabetic. 
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mortality, progression to renal replacement therapy as well as yearly health care costs. 
The clinic appointment schedule was more intensive than in Hopkins et al. (2011) and 
Harris et al. (1998), with intervals of only 1-3 months between visits. Results showed the 
greatest benefit of multidisciplinary care for Stage 4 patients; they had statistically 
significantly lower progression to renal replacement therapy after multivariate adjustment 
(p<0.001). Furthermore, patients under multidisciplinary care had significantly lower 
yearly healthcare costs, including costs associated with emergency and inpatient care 
(p<0.001). Patients in the control group also showed a comparatively faster annual eGFR 
decline (p=0.021) and a higher incidence of emergency initiation of renal replacement 
therapy (p=0.001).  
Finally, Johnson et al. (2016) described the impact of Reach Kidney Care, a program which 
assigned nurse coordinators to approximately 3,000 CKD patients across 16 states of the 
US. The report functions as an ongoing discussion of progress towards particular 
treatment goals, however it does highlight anecdotal evidence of patients modifying their 
behaviour in ways that reduce their blood pressure and HbA1c scores upon being 
counselled about the possible imminence of dialysis.13 The potential for nephrologist 
referral to drive patient behavioural changes was also mentioned in Feest et al. (1999). 
4.3 IMPACT OF CO-MORBIDITIES ON HOSPITALISATION AND EXPENDITURE 
Another set of literature has sought to analyse the way in which CKD interacts with 
common comorbidities in determining cost behaviour, including whether the functional 
form of the relationship is additive or subject to interaction. Smith et al. (2004) used a 
HMO population in Portland with Stage 2-4 CKD matched 1:1 with controls (by age and 
gender) to compare costs between the two cohorts. The results by CKD stage showed CKD 
subjects having significantly higher inpatient expenditures than the control cohorts for all 
stages, though the 95% confidence intervals for Stage 2 inpatient costs were non-
overlapping (and higher) than those for Stage 3.  Smith et al. note that diabetes was 
present in 30% of Stage 2 patients and 18% of Stage 3 patients, indicating the possibility of 
a selection bias in the way Stage 2 patients were identified or an increased number of 
comorbidities in this group. Furthermore, when pooling all stages of CKD together, the 
                                                        
13 HbA1c measures levels of glycosylated haemoglobin in the blood, which is considered representative of a 
patient’s blood sugar control over a 3-month period (Medline 2018).  
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average inpatient expenditure was approximately twice as high for CKD patients without 
comorbidities versus control cohorts without comorbidities. Total inpatient expenditure 
for CKD and related comorbidities was ($USD2001) $13,850 - approximately 40% higher 
than the additive estimation of CKD and related comorbidities separately ($10,000). 
However, the impact of each comorbidity was not individually reported. Honeycutt et al. 
(2013) used a two-part model to model the probability of positive annual spending in a US 
Medicare population, and then costs conditional on positive spending which isolated 
particular comorbidities. Significant results included that age was negatively associated 
with positive expenditure, and age-squared, hypertension, Stage 1 and 5 CKD were 
positively associated with positive expenditure. Furthermore, age and female gender were 
negatively associated with conditional expenditure at the 5% significance level, and age-
squared, diabetes and Stages 3,4, and 5 CKD were positively associated at the 5% level. 
However this paper used all costs with Medicare as a payer rather than a narrowed focus 
on inpatient costs. The Medicare program is also fee-for-service, which creates different 
incentives for health care professionals. Wyld et al. (2015) applied the second-part of the 
two-part Honeycutt et al. methodology to the AusDiab population - an Australian 
longitudinal survey tracking rates of diabetes, heart disease and kidney disease. 
Statistically significant relationships were not apparent between direct costs14  associated 
with diabetes and CKD concurrently versus diagnosed CKD only, and the author noted that 
costs associated with diabetes did not significantly vary as CKD worsened. On the other 
hand, Damien et al. (2016) found 39% higher costs among diabetic patients and 49% 
higher costs for patients with heart conditions (excluding hypertension) compared to 
those without that particular comorbidity. However, this study had a small sample size 
(n=138), and pooled transplant, dialysed and non-dialysed CKD patients into the same log-
linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, without controlling for each type of patient 
individually.   
 Khan et al. (2002) is a further paper which highlights the impact of cardiovascular disease 
on hospital utilization. Khan et al. studied a population of 259 patients at a single US 
nephrology service over a five-year window to determine factors associated with time to 
hospitalisation and hospitalisation days. Hospital utilization was determined to be 0.96 
                                                        
14 Direct costs in this study included hospitalisation, GP and outpatient visits, and pharmaceuticals (Wyld et 
al. 2015). 
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admissions per patient-year at risk for a total of 6.6 days per patient-year at risk. With 
respect to the variables available for estimation in this thesis, under multivariate analysis 
relative risk was significantly higher for hospitalisation with each increasing year of age 
(RR 1.02 : 95% CI 1.00,1.03) and for patients with cardiac disease (RR 1.91 : 95% CI 1.19, 
3.07).  
Finally, one of the most complex cost-effectiveness modelling procedures regarding CKD 
patients and hospital resource use was undertaken by the Health Technology Assessment 
programme in the UK (Black et al. 2010). The researchers simulated the progressive decline 
of renal function in non-diabetic patients through the use of a Markov model, and used 
estimated rates of non-fatal and fatal cardiovascular events, transitions to more severe CKD 
stages and mortality as factors in the model. This was then used as the basis for testing the 
cost effectiveness of referring patients at earlier and earlier stages of the disease. Costs in 
this study included GP visits, medication costs, and hospital costs associated with events. 
The highest QALYs were associated with referral of all Stage 3a patients, and recorded an 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of £3806/QALY when measured against referral at 
Stage 4. The authors noted that limited information regarding the effect of early referral on 
the natural progression of CKD and the rate of cardiovascular events led to significant 
sensitivities in the presented results. Furthermore, they acknowledged that cohort-wide 
referral as a benchmark would present major financial challenges. This issue of feasibility 
was also explored in Singh (2017), who used the 2012 Kidney Disease Improving Global 
Outcomes (KDIGO) referral guidelines to estimate that a particular U.S hospital nephrology 
service would see a 67% increase in new referrals and a 38% increase in overall patient 
volume if the guidelines were adhered to.  
4.4 SUMMARY 
The empirical literature contains some disagreement, however the weight of evidence is 
in support of the assertion that nephrologist care improves renal outcomes, and reduces 
inpatient expenditure. The evidence with regards to the impact of comorbidities (and the 
functional form of the relationship between CKD and comorbidities) is mixed. These 
themes will be explored in the remainder of the thesis with regards to the impact of 
nephrologist intervention on all-cause separation and expenditure patterns.  
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5 QH-CKD.QLD REGISTRY DATASET 
The dataset available for use was collected through the Chronic Kidney Disease 
Queensland (CKD.QLD) Registry, and its data-linkage partnership with QH.   
5.1 CKD.QLD REGISTRY 
The concept of surveilling CKD within a population received widespread attention when it 
was discussed at the 2006 KDIGO Controversies Conference (Venuthurupalli et al. 2017). 
Although patients receiving RRT were already commonly being tracked via national 
programs such as the Australia and New Zealand Dialysis and Transplant Registry 
(ANZDATA – established in 1977), there was broad recognition that this process was not 
capturing patients who progressed to ESRD and died without receiving RRT, or CKD 
patients who died of other causes before progressing to ESRD (ANZDATA 2019; Levey et 
al. 2007). One of the recommendations out of the conference was for all countries to 
establish Stage 4-5 CKD surveillance programs, with resource constraints as a rate limiting 
step for including earlier stages (Levey et al. 2007). The AIHW – reliant on comprehensive 
data to produce reports – created the National Centre for Monitoring Chronic Kidney 
Disease (NCM CKD) and the structure of the CKD.QLD Registry was informed by this work 
(Venuthurupalli et al. 2012).  Created in September 2009, after an approval process, the 
Registry began collecting patient information in May 2011. As of January 2019, the 
Registry has collected data on 9,005 participants (NHMRC CKD.CRE 2019). 
The Registry collects both demographic and clinical data from consenting patients who 
present to public outpatient nephrology clinics in the QH system. All QH clinics have been 
approved to participate in the program (Venuthurupalli et al. 2012), although there is 
variation noted with regard to the data quality, and the participation levels between sites. 
Patients in the sample for analysis were managed by the Mackay public renal service, 
which is administered through the Mackay Hospital and Health Service (HHS). For analytic 
purposes, Mackay offers a particular interest for further study due to the high 
participation rate of patients in the Registry (>95%), and by the fact that the consent date 
is aligned with the patient’s first visit to the service. Thus, the probability of systematic 
bias in the patients consenting to Registry surveillance versus the public outpatient 
nephrology service cohort as a whole is minimised, increasing the likelihood of unbiased 
and consistent estimates. The HHS catchment area contains over 182,000 people across 
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90,000 km2 and includes smaller local communities such as Bowen and Moranbah 
(Mackay Hospital and Health Service 2016). A map of health services is shown below in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 Map of Mackay HHS Catchment Area (Mackay Hospital and Health Service 2016) 
The closest public outpatient nephrology clinics to Mackay Base Hospital are Townsville to 
the north-west (~400km) and Rockhampton to the south-east (~335km) (KHA 2019).  A 
major advantage of data-linkage throughout the QH system is that all public inpatient 
separations across the state are captured. There is an acknowledged risk of patients being 
hospitalised out of state, or of interstate migration of Registry participants which is not 
appropriately coded. These risks would contribute downward bias to the estimates 
presented. It is assumed these risks are statistically negligible.   
5.2 QUEENSLAND HEALTH 
The dependent variables for analysis are all-cause separations, and QH expenditure on all-
cause separations. It was determined to be beyond the scope of analysis to discriminate 
between disease-related and non-disease related separations, and Hopkins et al. (2011) 
also considered all-cause resource utilisation alongside disease-related resource utilisation 
29 
 
in their paper. QH expenditure represents the dollar value paid by QH to the hospital 
involved for the patient separation. This does not reflect the true cost to the facility for 
the separation, though the two are related through an administrative feedback 
mechanism. From the perspective of QH, it signs Service Agreements with individual HHS’s 
to provide hospital services to patients and apportions funds out of its budget as part of 
the Agreement (Queensland Health 2018).  The current duration of Service Agreements 
are three years – where quantities and prices are set for the first year and renegotiated on 
a yearly basis (Queensland Health 2019a).  Although Agreements contain funding through 
a variety of channels including block funding, the majority is Activity Based Funding 
(ABF)15, of which the state’s input16 is calculated according to: Queensland Weighted 
Activity Unit (QWAU) x Queensland Efficient Price (QEP). A QWAU is closely linked to a 
NWAU, though Queensland exercises its right to adjust the activities included in the 
calculation.  
The building blocks of QWAU’s are patient types split by admission status, severity as well 
as type of care in some instances (e.g. mental health) (Queensland Health 2018). Patient 
episodes are then classified according to criteria, have a counting unit rule applied to 
them and then have a price set (Queensland Health 2018).  The classification criteria for 
acute admitted patients is the Australian refined diagnosis-related group (AR-DRG). It is a 
classification system used to sort patient episodes that are ‘clinically similar and resource 
homogenous’ (Queensland Health 2018, p. 16) according to the procedures, interventions, 
problems and diagnoses coded during the patient’s stay. The statistical process that 
informs the creation of the AR-DRG system utilises actual costing data supplied by health 
facilities to the National Hospital Cost Data Collection (NHCDC) (Independent Hospital 
Pricing Authority 2019; Australian Consortium for Classification Development 2016).  
Finally, a QEP is calculated as the average cost to perform a QWAU, with 
accounting/funding model adjustments, and taking into consideration the two year delay 
                                                        
15 120 hospitals in Queensland are block-funded due to issues of specialisation of services (including 
psychiatric hospitals), small size which precludes economies of scale or an inability to meet the technical 
specifications required for ABF (Queensland Health 2018). Small rural hospitals are two-thirds of these cases. 
Here, the IHPA determines a National Efficient Cost (NEC) which is applied to the hospital’s determined 
National Weighted Activity Units (NWAU), with modifications for remoteness (Independent Hospital Pricing 
Authority 2017). Specialised hospitals are funded via negotiation with the particular state or territory. See 
‘National Efficient Cost Determination 2017-18’ for further details (Independent Hospital Pricing Authority 
2017).  
16 The Commonwealth contributes ABF via National Efficient Prices (NEP) and NWAU (Independent Hospital 
Pricing Authority 2018).  
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between the dataset used to set the price and the year it is to be applied (Queensland 
Health 2018).  
From the perspective of the QH facility, it provides costing data to the Queensland 
Hospital Admitted Patient Data Collection (QHAPDC) as stated in the Service Agreement. 
The payment that is received for a patient episode is then calculated according to 
predetermined rules – the procedure for acute admitted patients is described below (also 
as shown in Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Hypothetical Cost vs.Funding Depiction (from Department of Health ‘Health Funding Principles and Guidelines 
2013-14’ p.20) 
 There is a particular price attached to same-day admissions. From there, for admissions 
that are (Department of Health 2013 p.21); 
 at least overnight but below the lower inlier boundary (usually set at 1/3 the 
Australian average length of stay (LOS) for a set AR-DRG code) – payment is at a 
‘short stay outlier base plus the short-stay outlier per diem multiplied by the 
number of days’  
 between the low inlier and high inlier boundary – payment is at an ‘inlier price 
weight’  
 above the high inlier boundary (usually set at 3x the Australian average LOS for a 
set AR-DRG code) – payment is an ‘inlier price weight plus the long stay outlier per 
diem multiplied by the number of days above the upper inlier bound’. 
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The depiction above has a hypothetical costing line, however it should be noted that for 
patient episodes above the high inlier boundary there is an expected financial penalty for 
excessively long patient stays relative to their AR-DRG classification (Department of Health 
2013).  
Analysis of all-cause QH expenditure will be strictly related to the payments made by QH 
to the particular facilities, rather than the costs incurred by those facilities to treat the 
patients. The extent to which QH expenditure adequately compensates facilities for the 
costs of treating CKD patients with a given AR-DRG code cannot be determined within the 
dataset, and will therefore not be discussed further. QH also does not provide expenditure 
information for patients admitted privately to a public hospital. Due to this, these 
separations are not included in the forthcoming analysis. 
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6 ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
Establishing strategies for causal inference accounting for the parameters of the QH-
Registry dataset will be discussed in this section. It should be noted – a control group was 
not available for analysis, which precluded the use of many traditional econometric 
methods for establishing treatment effects such as propensity score matching. The 
structure of the dataset will be explored with respect to both dependent and independent 
variables. Then, the models chosen for analysis will be justified within the context of the 
research questions of interest to be tested. Descriptive statistics will conclude the chapter.  
6.1 DATASET STRUCTURE 
The dataset under analysis represented one year of all-cause separation and expenditure 
data both before and after consent into the Registry. Each separation was provided as a 
separate observation. Given the dataset contained repeated observations of individuals, a 
panel data method was chosen for analysis. A time structure of eight 3-month quarters 
was adopted in order to provide a balance between enough data points for statistical 
analysis and a desire to avoid noise by setting a time interval too small. The Registry 
recruited new patients at the Mackay site on a rolling basis beginning in early May 2011.  
All patients were therefore synchronised to have consented into the Registry on the first 
day of Quarter 5. The separate Registry and QH datasets were able to be merged based on 
their shared use of unique patient identification numbers. 
The information from the Registry included; consent date into the Registry, date of RRT 
commencement (if applicable), date of death (if applicable), birth date (month and year), 
sex, eGFR (at the date of consent), and dummy variables for cardiovascular disease and 
diabetes (if present at the date of consent). In this dataset, cardiovascular disease 
encompassed coronary artery disease, heart failure, cerebrovascular disease, peripheral 
vascular disease and a ‘cardiovascular all other’ free text response category.  It should be 
noted, patient data available for econometric analysis did not include any medical 
variables that were repeatedly measured. In terms of the diabetes and cardiovascular 
disease dummy variable, an assumption had to be made that the patient’s disease was 
present throughout the entire pre-intervention period (whether formally diagnosed or 
not), as no further information was available.  This assumption was considered to be 
reasonable, given the short timeframe under analysis. 
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The observations provided by QH included; admission date, length of stay, expenditure 
and DRG code.17  The boundaries of the QH dataset were 1st July 2011 to 1st July 2016. As a 
result, the expenditure values provided by QH were in nominal prices, requiring a 
conversion to constant prices ($AUD 2015-16 dollars). This was undertaken using the 
‘government final consumption expenditure (GFCE) on hospitals and nursing homes’ price 
index (AIHW 2016). The price index values are shown below in Table 1. 
Table 1 ‘GFCE on hospitals and nursing homes’ Price Index (AIHW 2016) 
Year 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
Price Index  90.6 93.2 95.9 98.1 100.0 
 
Dunn et al. (2016) recommends a price index targeted toward medical prices for situations 
in which observations span years, but are analysed through a single process. This is 
consistent with the data methods discussed in the AIHW’s Health Expenditure Australia 
2015-16 report which outlines the use of the ‘GFCE hospitals and nursing homes’ index for 
deflating expenditure associated with public hospitals and public hospital services (AIHW 
2016).  
6.2 INCLUSION CRITERIA  
Registry patient information was provided up until a consent date of June 2017. Given the 
QH dataset boundary of 30th June 2016, a requirement for inclusion in the study was a 
Registry consent date which allowed all eight quarters to be observed. A particular 
advantage of the extended Registry observation window was updated information 
identifying patients who started RRT or died in the year after June 2016. After a review of 
the empirical literature, RRT and death represented a particular expenditure imbalance 
which needed to be addressed as exclusion criteria.  By definition, patients could not die 
during the pre-intervention period. Furthermore, patients were excluded from the 
Registry if they had already started RRT at the time of consent. St Peter et al. (2004) found 
a significant increase in costs in the six months prior to dialysis initiation. Furthermore, 
there is a recognised significant increase in costs in the final year of life (Productivity 
Commission 2005). The inclusion of patients who started dialysis or were within six 
                                                        
17 DRG codes are a sub-classification of AR-DRG codes. 
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months of starting dialysis during the post-intervention year would represent a series of 
expenditures in the post-intervention year which could not be similarly accrued in the pre-
intervention year. Furthermore, patients who died in the post-intervention year or were 
within a year of death during post-intervention year also represent a series of 
expenditures which could not be similarly accrued in the pre-intervention year. Therefore, 
any patients who matched these criteria were excluded. Patients whose separations were 
entirely privately coded were also excluded, due to fact that the econometric methods 
utilised would treat these patients in a similar manner to those without any separations 
recorded. Patients who recorded a mixture of public and private separations were 
included, which is a known limitation. The privately-recorded separations were excluded 
from analysis for these patients. The sample for analysis was 243 patients. 
6.3 ADAPTION OF TWO-PART MODEL 
A common model specification for healthcare expenditure is the two-part model - which 
has been previously used by Honeycutt et al. (2013) in this area of research. Crucially, this 
method is employed with cross-sectional data.  The two-part model considers the 
probability of positive expenditure (estimated via probit or logit), and then expenditure, 
conditional on having positive expenditure. The second part of the model is generally 
estimated using a log-linear OLS specification or via generalized linear model (Buntin & 
Zaslavsky 2004, Diehr et al. 1999, Mihaylova et al. 2001).  Although estimated separately, 
these models can be combined to produce an unconditional model of expected costs 
(Buntin & Zaslavsky 2004); 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟((𝑦𝑖 > 0)𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 > 0)               (1) 
The above model can be implemented using Stata’s twopm command.  
However, given that the dataset under analysis is a panel dataset and there are strong 
theoretical motivations for individual-specific effects, this thesis sought to adapt the 
general framework of a two-part model to panel data. Firstly, to address the research 
question of whether nephrologist treatment reduces the number of inpatient separations, 
a panel logit method was chosen for analysis with a binary variable of ‘at least one 
separation in a given quarter’.  This variable was chosen to be binary, rather than a count 
model which tracks the number of separations due to the fact that a patient may undergo 
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a number of separations within a given hospital stay. Expenditure values of separations 
range from $20.09 to $149,154.33 in the dataset. Therefore, it was decided that 
prioritising the number of separations risked placing a greater emphasis on administrative 
processes rather than capturing a more general indicator of hospital usage. An 
acknowledged limitation of this decision is that a single hospital stay which contains more 
than one separation, where at least one of the separations crosses the arbitrary dividing 
line between two quarters, will register a 1 in both quarters.  Panel logit was also chosen 
for analysis over panel probit, as panel probit is not able to accommodate fixed effects 
(Cameron & Trivedi 2005). Secondly, to address the research question of whether all-
cause inpatient expenditure is lower as a result of nephrologist care, panel linear models 
will be used to investigate conditional expenditure.  
6.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION  
The general framework for the model under analysis is specified as18; 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑥_𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖 +
 𝛽6𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽7𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖 +
 𝛽9𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟_1𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟_2𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟_3𝑡 +
 𝛽12𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟_5𝑡 +  𝛽13𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟_6𝑡 +  𝛽14𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟_7𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟_8𝑡                                                                                   
Cardiovascular disease, diabetes and eGFR enter the specification separately, and then 
diabetes and cardiovascular disease are each interacted with eGFR. This is done to address 
the research question of interest as to whether statistically significant effects can be 
established with regards to the interaction between CKD and other comorbidities. The 
treatment effect of nephrologist referral is an 𝑥𝑡 variable, as all patients are in their pre-
intervention phase in Quarters 1-4, and post-intervention in Quarters 5-8. A complication 
of the model specification which requires acknowledgement is that the entire sample is 
drawn from Mackay. As a result, measuring the treatment effect through the use of time 
dummy variables in a sample that draws from such a small geographic area faces the issue 
that unobserved local factors may bias the estimates. For example, if all time dummy 
variables represented particular calendar dates, issues such as air quality and outbreaks of 
infectious disease could impact the coefficients unless they were controlled for. However, 
                                                        
18 An intercept term is not included for generalisability reasons - as it is removed from analysis in the fixed-
effects models to be estimated. 
(2) 
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the fact that the Registry enrolled patients on a rolling basis is protective in this situation, 
because the dataset is structured such that each quarter represents individualised 
calendar dates based on the patient’s consent date into the Registry. In this way, 
statistically significant trends for the time variables coded would not be tied to particular 
calendar dates, and therefore be more robust as a result.   
A number of coding strategies were considered to model the intervention, an outline of 
which is provided below in Table 2. 
Table 2 Nephrologist Intervention Coding Strategies 
Time Binary Variable Factor Variables Constant Trend Post-Treatment Trend 
Q1 0 1 1 0 
Q2 0 1 2 0 
Q3 0 1 3 0 
Q4 0 - 4 0 
Q5 1 1 5 1 
Q6 1 1 6 2 
Q7 1 1 7 3 
Q8 1 1 8 4 
 
The binary variable approach theorises nephrologist referral to have a stable effect across 
Quarter 5-8, and does not attempt to model pre-intervention trends. The use of factor 
variables would allow for trends in separations and expenditure to be catalogued across 
the entire time period, with a base category of Quarter 4 highlighting a potential break in 
behaviour. A constant trend may reveal a uniform increase or decline in patients having at 
least one separation in a quarter over time, and a post-treatment trend would not 
attempt to catalogue pre-treatment behaviour, but would allow nephrologist intervention 
to have trend effects in Quarter 5-8. A factor variable approach was chosen, in order to aid 
understanding about the trend in pre-intervention separation and expenditure patterns, 
and also to assign specific effects to each quarter. This decision replicates the use of (T-1) 
time dummy variables for FE and RE logit estimation of whether a household was in 
poverty in a five-year panel dataset in Allison (2009). It is recognised that a trade-off is 
made at this juncture to sacrifice parsimony for flexibility. The choice to use the factor 
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variable approach instead of a binary variable will be tested using a Wald test. The 
hypothesis tested will be that all coefficients in the post-intervention periods are equal, 
which would support using a binary variable approach instead (Wooldridge 2002).  
6.5 PANEL LOGIT ANALYSIS  
The pooled logit model (Cameron & Trivedi 2009);  
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 |𝒙𝒊𝒕 ) =  Λ(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  Λ(𝑧) =
𝑒𝑧
1 + 𝑒𝑧
 
treats observations as independent across 𝑖and 𝑡.  Cluster-robust standard errors must 
therefore be employed for use of this model with panel data. It maximises the partial log-
likelihood function (Wooldridge 2002); 
ℒ(β) =  ∑
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑{𝑦𝑖𝑡 ln Λ(
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡) ln(1 −  Λ(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽))} 
which is √𝑁 – consistent for the estimation of β. In this thesis, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 may be represented by 
Equation 2 – with an intercept term included. 
However it is considered likely that there are individual effects present in the data, which 
motivates the specification of both fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE) logit models, in 
order to compare with the results of the pooled model. FE logit removes the individual 
intercept term from the equation using conditional maximum likelihood estimation 
(conditional MLE). As described by Stammann (2016) the fixed effect logit model specifies 
the logistic probability of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ; 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽, 𝛼𝑖) =  𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡)
1−𝑦𝑖𝑡  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖𝑡 = Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝛽, 𝛼𝑖) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛼𝑖−𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1[𝑎𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 > 0]  
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is an error term which is logistically distributed.  𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 is specified as in Equation 2. 
In this scenario, 𝑎𝑖  cannot be consistently estimated in short panels due to the incidental 
parameters problem (Baltagi 2008).  A minimal sufficient statistic is instead found for 𝑎𝑖  in 
Σ𝑡=1
𝑇  𝑦𝑖𝑡  , and the conditional likelihood function is maximised (Baltagi 2008); 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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𝐿𝑐 =  ∏ 𝑃𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (
𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
)  
and β is estimated via conditional logit. From Cameron & Trivedi (2005), the density is; 
  𝑓(𝑦𝑖| ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐, 𝑥𝑖, 𝛽)   
𝑡
= exp ((∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡)𝛽))/ ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝((∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡)𝛽)
𝑡𝑑∈𝐵𝑐𝑡
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐵𝑐 =  {𝑑𝑖|  ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑡
𝑐
𝑡
} 
In order for an individual to be included in the estimation process, a person’s value for 𝑦𝑖𝑡  
must change at a given point, otherwise the probability of the value observed is assigned 
to be 1, and ln(1) = 0 (Baltagi 2008). 
The time invariant heterogeneity component is no longer present in the above estimation 
(Cameron & Trivedi 2009), nor are time-invariant characteristics due to the differencing 
process. Under particular regularity conditions regarding the 𝑎𝑖  parameter, β is 
consistently estimated (Baltagi 2008, Chamberlain 1980).  Consistency is also requires the 
conditional independence assumption (Wooldridge 2002); 
𝑦𝑖1 … 𝑦𝑖𝑇 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑛 (𝑥𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) 
One of the disadvantages of a FE logit model is the difficulty of computing marginal 
effects, as 𝑎𝑖  has an unrestricted distribution (Wooldridge 2002). Although Stata offers a 
post-estimation prediction command with xtlogit, it implicitly sets a FE value of zero. 
RE logit assumes 𝑎𝑖  to be a randomly distributed variable N(0,𝜎𝛼
2) and integrates it out of 
the estimation equation. The joint density is specified (Cameron & Trivedi 2005);  
𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝛽, 𝛼𝑖) =  ∏ Λ(𝑎𝑖 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽)𝑦𝑖𝑡 {1 − Λ (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽)}1−𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
and a log likelihood is maximised; 
∑ ln ∫ 𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝛽, 𝛼𝑖) ∗
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝛼2
exp(
−𝛼𝑖
2𝜎𝛼2
)2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 𝑑𝛼𝑖  
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
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Stata uses 12-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature as a method to solve the integral, and a 
quadrature check may be used as a post-estimation command to re-estimate the model 
using 8- and 16-points in order to test whether the coefficients of the model change 
significantly (Cameron & Trivedi 2009).  A number of difficulties arise from use of the RE 
logit model, particularly that Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 |𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽) ≠  Λ(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽) and it is not considered 
appropriate to compare these coefficients with the output from population-average or 
pooled logit (Cameron & Trivedi 2009). Furthermore, 𝛼𝑖  is not estimated - which does not 
allow for either prediction or a precise estimation of marginal effects, given both require 
calculation of 𝛼𝑖  (Cameron & Trivedi 2009); 
𝜕 Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ , 𝛽, 𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑡
=  𝛽𝑗  Λ (𝛼𝑖 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽){1 − Λ(𝛼𝑖 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽)} 
Automatic Stata prediction commands assume 𝛼𝑖 = 0.  
6.6 DISCUSSION OF FIXED EFFECTS VERSUS RANDOM EFFECTS 
A contextual analysis is undertaken here with regards to the expected behaviour of 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 𝑎𝑖  in Registry patients.  FE and RE differ with 
respect to their assumptions of the statistical properties of 𝑎𝑖.
19 FE models allow for 
correlation between 𝑎𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖, because the conditional distribution does not depend on 𝑎𝑖  
(Wooldridge 2002).  A RE model theorises 𝑎𝑖  to be random variable which is uncorrelated 
with 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡.  
As continuous variables, correlation between 𝑎𝑖  and age or eGFR infers that knowledge of 
𝑎𝑖  informs a person about the expectation of age or eGFR. Correlation between 𝑎𝑖  and the 
dummy variables cardiovascular, diabetes and female relate to changes in the probability 
of someone having these characteristics based on 𝑎𝑖. The strongest case for 𝑎𝑖  correlated 
with regressors is Indigenous status. Data collected from the Mackay site did not record a 
patient’s Indigenous status. Moreover, patterns of disease within the Indigenous 
population show considerable differences among the variables under analysis. Rates of 
hospitalisation for CKD as a principal or additional diagnosis20 per 100,000 population 
were slightly over 5 times as high for Indigenous patients in 2013-14 (AIHW 2015). This 
occurrence affects men and women differently, with Indigenous women having 
                                                        
19 Note that 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡  |𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑖) = 0 is maintained for both FE and RE models (Wooldridge 2002). 
20 Hospitalisation for regular dialysis is excluded from this calculation. 
(12) 
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hospitalisation rates 6 times that of non-Indigenous women as opposed to Indigenous 
men being hospitalised at 4 times the rate of non-Indigenous men (AIHW 2015). The onset 
of ESRD also occurs earlier in life among Indigenous patients, and Indigenous patients are 
more than twice as likely to have diabetes, cardiovascular disease and CKD concurrently as 
non-Indigenous patients (AIHW 2015). In Australia low socioeconomic status (SES) is also 
associated with a higher prevalence of CKD (AIHW 2019c). Moreover, of patients who 
have diabetes, cardiovascular disease and CKD, low SES is associated with 2.4 times the 
rate of hospitalisation of the group with the highest SES (AIHW 2014). Socioeconomic 
status is not controlled for in the model, introducing a second candidate for time-invariant 
individual heterogeneity. 
The theoretical case for RE in this model rests on unobservable patient factors that could 
be distributed among patients randomly. Likely candidates include comorbidities that are 
not captured by the model (like cancer or physical disability), social support systems that 
can direct health issues to primary care before escalation to tertiary care is required, and 
the interaction of all agents such as GP’s and allied health professionals in the patient’s 
overall health status.  
6.7 MODEL SELECTION AND DIAGNOSTICS 
Three separate models were estimated for comparison; a pooled logit model, a RE panel 
logit model and a FE panel logit model. The final results are reported with cluster-robust 
standard errors, however the RE model was initially run without any adjustment to default 
standard errors in order to produce a model selection test. Stata automatically provides a 
likelihood ratio test based on the RE logit output. Random effects posits an intraclass 
correlation of error (Cameron & Trivedi 2009); 
𝜌𝑢 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟 (𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖𝑠) =
𝜎𝛼
2
𝜎𝛼2 +  𝜎𝑢2
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 
 due to the persistent presence of 𝛼𝑖. A likelihood ratio test considers the null hypothesis 
of 𝜌𝑢 = 0, which if not rejected would suggest xtlogit produces equivalent coefficients to 
the pooled logit command.  
A determination of whether RE or FE are present in the data cannot be made based on the 
Hausman test. The Hausman test considers the difference in coefficients estimated under 
(13) 
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FE versus RE models, given that FE estimators are consistent if 𝑎𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are correlated, 
whereas RE estimators are not (Wooldridge 2002). The model; 
(𝜃𝐹?̂? −  𝜃𝑅?̃?)
′
[ 𝑉𝐹𝐸 − 𝑉𝑅𝐸]
−1((𝜃𝐹?̂? −  𝜃𝑅?̃?) 
is tested in Stata. In the context of the Hausman test, Wooldridge states (2002, p. 289),  
‘Let δ̃RE denote the vector of random effects estimates without the coefficients on time-
constant variables or aggregate time variables, and let  δ̃FE denote the corresponding fixed 
effects estimates…’. While single variables that represent policy effects can have a Hausman 
test directly applied to them, applying a Hausman test to time variables is not considered 
appropriate (Wooldridge 2002).  
The major model diagnostic test that may be run is Stata’s quadchk command for the RE 
model, which is designed to check the stability of coefficients estimated to small changes 
in the integration process.  A relative difference between coefficients of less than 0.0001 
translates to ‘results [that] may be confidently interpreted’ (Stata 2019a, p.2), however a 
second threshold given is 0.01 – above which ‘quadrature is not reliably approximating the 
likelihood’ (Stata 2019a, p.2). When considering the other measures of goodness of fit, the 
central difficulty of comparing the models is the FE model’s significantly reduced sample 
size. Although the information criterion AIC and BIC can be used to compare non-nested 
models (Stata 2019b), the models are fundamentally testing two different sets of data – 
where the FE sample has been systematically selected, as it removes all patients with 
either zero separations or at least one separation in every quarter. In terms of McFadden’s 
pseudo-R2 value; 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅𝑀𝐹
2 = 1 −
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡
 
McFadden states that values between 0.2-0.4 provide ‘excellent fit’ (1977, p.35). 
6.8 LOG-LINEAR LEAST SQUARES – EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 
The second part of the two-part model (which is conditional on positive expenditure) 
commonly employs either a log-transformation of the expenditure variable estimated 
using OLS, or a generalized linear model instead. A log-linear OLS model was selected for 
analysis, due to the ability to adapt this model in a straightforward manner to panel data 
(15) 
(14) 
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techniques. Three log-linear models were estimated; a pooled model, a FE model and a RE 
model.  
The pooled model estimates (Cameron & Trivedi 2005); 
ln(𝑦𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡   
It is commonly assumed that errors are independent over 𝑖, however cluster-robust 
standard errors can be employed to recognise that individual 𝑖’s errors are likely to be 
correlated over 𝑡.  Pooled OLS is a consistent but inefficient estimator of β in the event of 
RE present within the data, however it is inconsistent in the presence of FE (Cameron & 
Trivedi 2005). 
The individual-specific effects model estimates (Cameron & Trivedi 2005); 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
An FE model uses a within transformation to remove 𝛼𝑖  (Cameron & Trivedi 2005); 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 −  𝑦?̅? = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 −  𝑥?̅?)
′𝛽 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖)     𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
which produces consistent estimates of β. A consequence of the removal of the intercept 
is that the conditional mean cannot be determined, as well as the inability to predict the 
expectation of the dependent variable, given a set of covariates. Furthermore, all time-
invariant variables are removed. A RE model assumes (Cameron & Trivedi 2005); 
𝑎𝑖~[𝛼, 𝜎𝛼
2], 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~ [0, 𝜎𝑢
2]  
and uses feasible GLS as an estimation technique. RE models allow estimation of the 
intercept term and all time-invariant regressors. 
The model specification for the pooled OLS model is; 
ln (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖
+  𝛽6𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽7𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖
+  𝛽9𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟2𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟3𝑡 +  𝛽12𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟5𝑡
+  𝛽13𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟6𝑡 +  𝛽14𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟7𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟8𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
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The RE model specification is; 
ln (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖
+  𝛽6𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽7𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝐷𝑖
+  𝛽9𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟2𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟3𝑡
+  𝛽12𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟5𝑡 +  𝛽13𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟6𝑡 +  𝛽14𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟7𝑡
+ 𝛽15𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟8𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is equicorrelated – as (Cameron & Trivedi 2005) ; 
𝐶𝑜𝑟[𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑠] =
𝜎𝛼
2
𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝛼2
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 
The FE within model specification is equal to Equation 18 with 𝑥𝑖𝑡 equal to Equation 2. 
As previously discussed, a Hausman test cannot be used to differentiate between FE and 
RE models. However a determination between the pooled OLS model and RE model can 
be made using a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test. The null hypothesis for this test 
is that there is no panel effect with regards to variance operating within the data, and 
pooled OLS may be used (Torres-Reyna 2007). 
6.9 MODEL RETRANSFORMATION 
A log-linear OLS model estimates (Manning & Mullahy 2001); 
𝐸(ln(𝑦) |𝑥) = 𝑥𝛽 
which requires retransformation for analysis of 𝐸(𝑦|𝑥). The method of retransformation 
can be selected via residual analysis of the above equation on non-zero expenditure 
values. Residuals are checked for normality and heteroscedasticity, which guides the 
retransformation process used. If residuals of; 
ln(𝑦) =  𝛽𝑥 +  𝜀 
are normal and homoscedastic 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2); 
 𝐸(𝑦|𝑥) = exp (𝑥𝛽 + 0.5𝜎𝜀
2) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
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should be used as the retransformation equation (Manning & Mullahy 2001). If the error 
term is independently and identically distributed rather than normally distributed, or 𝑒𝜀 
has a stable mean and variance (Manning & Mullahy 2001); 
𝐸(𝑦|𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑒𝜀)𝑒𝛽𝑥 
and Duan’s smearing estimator for 𝐸(𝑒𝜀) which uses the regression residuals to 
approximate 𝜀 should be employed, as it is consistent. Error terms that are 
heteroscedastic require modelling of the variance.  
Preliminary testing of residuals involves three separate Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
tests for heteroscedasticity. Stata tests the model; 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑦|𝑥) = ℎ(𝛼1 + 𝑧′𝛼2) 
for 𝐻𝑜 : 𝛼2 = 0. The first test assumes normality of the residuals and uses 𝑦 ̂ as z, the 
second test does not assume normality of the residuals but retains 𝑦 ̂as z, and the third 
does not assume normality of residuals but uses all regressors as z (Cameron & Trivedi 
2009). Normality of residuals is tested using Stata’s sktest. 
6.10 DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY- REGRESSORS 
Presented below in Table 3 is a descriptive summary of the patient sample for analysis. 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics – CKD Registry Patients 
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
Age   Sex (Female=1)  
Overall 62.56 (14.99) Overall 0.42 (0.49) 
Between (15.00) Between (0.49) 
Within (0.64) Within (0) 
eGFR  Diabetes  
Overall 46.54 (23.18) Overall 0.42 (0.49) 
Between (23.22) Between (0.49) 
Within (0) Within (0) 
Cardiovascular    
Overall 0.49 (0.5)   
Between (0.5)   
Within (0)   
(25) 
(26) 
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In terms of comorbidities, 49% of patients have cardiovascular disease and 42% have 
diabetes. Ages range from 15 to 90, and eGFR ranges from 7 to 91. The 30th percentile for 
eGFR is 30, which is the cutoff point below which Kidney Health Australia recommends 
referral for ‘CKD of any cause’ (KHA 2015, p.20). Given eGFR is the only kidney function 
variable provided in the Registry dataset and the majority of patients have been referred 
to a nephrologist in advance of the eGFR-specific recommendation, the issue of omitted 
variables will be returned to in the Limitations section.  As previously noted, there is no 
within variation in any comorbidity variable.  
The distribution of comorbidity by CKD stage is provided below in Table 4. 
Table 4 Comorbidity Distribution, by Patient (% of sample)  
CKD Stage No Diabetes, No CVD Diabetes, No 
Cardiovascular 
Disease 
No Diabetes, 
Cardiovascular 
Disease 
Diabetes & CVD 
Stage 1 19 (7.8%) 3 (1.23%) 3 (1.23%) 2 (0.82%) 
Stage 2 19 (7.8%) 2 (0.82%) 5 (2.06%) 8 (3.29%) 
Stage 3a 18 (7.41%) 6 (2.47%) 8 (3.29%) 10 (4.12%) 
Stage 3b 22 (9.05%) 10 (4.12%) 14 (5.76%) 26 (10.70%) 
Stage 4 17 (7.00%) 4 (1.65%) 15 (6.17%) 28 (11.52%) 
Stage 5 2 (0.82%) 1 (0.41%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.41%) 
Total 97 (40%) 26 (10.70%) 45 (18.52%) 75 (30.86%) 
 
Stage 5 patients of any comorbidity load only represent four people in the dataset. 
Similarly, Stage 1 patients with either diabetes, cardiovascular disease or both represent a 
sample size of eight. An alternate representation of the eGFR variable could entail 
grouping patients by CKD stage. However, given the low patient numbers for particular 
comorbidity distributions it was determined that multiple CKD stages would have to be 
compressed into a single group, which is a loss of efficiency compared to keeping eGFR as 
a continuous variable.  
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6.11 DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY – DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The two dependent variables for analysis are an indicator variable for at least one 
separation in a given quarter, and the log-transformed accumulated QH expenditure for 
the quarter. Only 373 quarters of 1944 observed registered at least one separation, 
therefore 19.19% of the separation variable is coded as 1. 69.42% of patients recorded at 
least one separation in a given quarter over the eight quarters observed. Descriptive 
statistics of the binary dependent variable are provided below in Table 5. The continuous 
variables age and eGFR have been transformed into age ranges and CKD stages solely for 
reporting purposes. 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics - Binary Dependent Variable 
Variable Number of 
Observations 
Mean SD 
Age Range21:    
Under 55 500 0.13 0.34 
55-64 370 0.22 0.42 
65-74 663 0.23 0.42 
75+ 411 0.17 0.37 
Sex (Female=1):    
0 1128 0.21 0.41 
1 816 0.17 0.38 
CKD Stage:    
Stage 1 216 0.17 0.37 
Stage 2 272 0.20 0.40 
Stage 3a 336 0.16 0.37 
Stage 3b 576 0.18 0.38 
Stage 4 512 0.22 0.42 
Stage 5 32 0.38 0.49 
Diabetes:    
0 1136 0.17 0.37 
1 808 0.23 0.42 
                                                        
21 Due to a patient’s age changing over time, one patient may be represented in multiple categories. 
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Cardiovascular:    
0 984 0.14 0.35 
1 960 0.24 0.43 
Quarter:    
1 243 0.14 0.35 
2 243 0.14 0.35 
3 243 0.19 0.39 
4 243 0.25 0.43 
5 243 0.28 0.45 
6 243 0.18 0.39 
7 243 0.19 0.40 
8 243 0.17 0.38 
 
From Table 5, it can be seen in the ‘Quarter’ variable that the number of patients who 
record at least one separation in the specified quarter rises from Quarters 1-5, before 
declining. As quarters will be coded as factor variables, omitting Quarter 4 appears 
reasonable to test the statistical significance of trends pre- and post-intervention. 
Considering the comorbidity variables, patients who are coded as having diabetes or 
cardiovascular disease have a higher number of quarters in which at least one separation 
occurred. For the CKD stage variable, there is a marked increase in the number of quarters 
recording at least one separation for patients with Stage 5 CKD.  
A histogram for quarterly expenditure is provided below in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4 Histogram for Quarterly Expenditure 
Mean quarterly expenditure is $2368, with a standard deviation of $10, 486.  The data is 
considerably positively skewed, with a skewness of 9.09 and kurtosis 114.72. As an 
indication of the distribution of the tail, the 99th percentile of the data is at $46,721 while 
the largest observation is $177,725. A log-transformation of the quarterly expenditure 
variable was conducted, with a histogram provided below in Figure 5. The transformed 
variable aligns with the traditional definition of the second part of a two-part model, 
which is expenditure, conditional on positive expenditure. 
 
Figure 5 Histogram for Log-Transformed Quarterly Expenditure 
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Stata’s skewness and normality test sktest (based on D’Agostino, Belanger and D’Agostino 
(1990), with amendments by Royston (1991)) did not reject the null hypothesis that the 
variable is normally distributed (Prob>chi2: 0.0567) (Stata 2019c). 
Descriptive statistics of the log-transformed expenditure variable are provided below, in 
Table 6. 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics - Log-Transformed Quarterly Expenditure 
Variable Number of 
Observations 
Mean SD 
Age Range:    
Under 55 67 8.42 1.36 
55-64 83 8.88 1.38 
65-74 155 8.60 1.35 
75+ 68 8.09 1.28 
Sex (Female=1):    
0 234 8.68 1.33 
1 139 8.30 1.40 
CKD Stage:    
Stage 1 36 8.31 1.33 
Stage 2 54 8.57 1.44 
Stage 3a 53 8.49 1.45 
Stage 3b 103 8.46 1.35 
Stage 4 115 8.63 1.33 
Stage 5 12 9.02 1.29 
Diabetes:    
0 188 8.45 1.37 
1 185 8.63 1.36 
Cardiovascular:    
0 142 8.22 1.33 
1 231 8.73 1.36 
Quarter:    
1 34 8.63 1.82 
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2 35 8.66 1.65 
3 45 8.77 1.32 
4 60 8.65 1.37 
5 67 8.61 1.18 
6 44 8.13 1.18 
7 47 8.25 1.42 
8 41 8.57 1.04 
 
As a monotonic transformation, increasing values of the log-transformed quarterly 
expenditure variable represent increasing values of the underlying quarterly expenditure 
variable. It can be seen in Table 6 that conditional on positive expenditure, mean quarterly 
expenditure rises from Quarter 1-3, declines between Quarters 4-6 before rising again in 
Quarters 7-8.  Similarly to the separation variable, mean quarterly expenditure is higher 
for patients who have cardiovascular disease than those who do not, and higher for 
patients who have diabetes as opposed to those who do not. Finally, Stage 5 CKD patients 
have the largest mean quarterly expenditure of all CKD stages, however this must be 
noted in the context of the small sample size.    
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7 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION - SEPARATION 
This chapter details the results of econometric analysis performed on the dependent 
variable of ‘at least one separation in a given quarter’. Results will be discussed in the 
context of the two relevant questions of interest under analysis; 
1. Are patients separated from hospital less frequently as a result of nephrologist 
care? 
2. Are statistically significant relationships able to be established regarding the 
interaction between CKD and comorbidities, with respect to their impact on 
separation? 
Model specification and diagnostic test results will also be presented.  
7.1 PANEL LOGIT RESULTS - SEPARATION 
 
Table 7 Panel Logit Comparison 
  Pooled Logit   RE Logit   FE Logit   
       
Age 0.002  0.002  0.029  
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.239)  
       
Sex_F -0.166  -0.170  0  
 (0.172)  (0.196)  (.)  
       
eGFR -0.003  -0.003  0  
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (.)  
       
Diabetes -0.299  -0.407  0  
 (0.577)  (0.654)  (.)  
       
CVD 0.010  0.091  0  
 (0.491)  (0.523)  (.)  
       
Diabetes*eGFR 0.002  0.003  0  
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (.)  
       
CVD*eGFR 0.006  0.006  0  
 (0.009)  (0.010)  (.)  
       
Diabetes*CVD 0.602  0.706  0  
 (0.412)  (0.472)  (.)  
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Quarter_1 -0.713 ** -0.819 ** -0.800 * 
 (0.234)  (0.267)  (0.321)  
       
Quarter_2 -0.680 ** -0.781 ** -0.77 ** 
 (0.208)  (0.238)  (0.247)  
       
Quarter_3 -0.374  -0.433  -0.427  
 (0.198)  (0.229)  (0.233)  
       
Quarter_5 0.153  0.179  0.172  
 (0.187)  (0.219)  (0.227)  
       
Quarter_6 -0.404 * -0.466 * -0.482  
 (0.204)  (0.235)  (0.263)  
       
Quarter_7 -0.322  -0.372  -0.393  
 (0.213)  (0.247)  (0.313)  
       
Quarter_8 -0.493 * -0.567 * -0.595  
 (0.217)  (0.251)  (0.346)  
       
_cons -1.297 * -1.497 *                   
 (0.538)  (0.647)                    
       
/lnsig2u     -0.0324       
   (0.217)    
ρ   0.227    
LR Test      0.000       
Prob>chi^2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0279  
Pseudo R-sq 0.033    0.028  
AIC 1870.2  1805.6  997.4  
BIC 1959.4  1900.3  1039  
Log-Likelihood -919.1  -885.8  -490.7  
N 1944   1944   1344   
 
1Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
2Significance: *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
In terms of model selection, the likelihood ratio test rejected the null hypothesis of ρ=0, 
favouring the RE model over the pooled logit model. A quadrature check of the RE model 
(provided in Appendix 2) showed relative differences of less than 0.0001 for all variables 
and the log likelihood, with the exception of the log of the panel-level variance (-
0.000120). However, this value is well below the threshold of 0.01 beyond which the 
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model is not reliably approximating the likelihood.  The pseudo R-squared values for both 
the RE and FE model are well below McFadden’s values of 0.2-0.4, indicating a potential 
issue with the fit of the data. As previously discussed, an econometric determination of 
whether RE or FE is preferred cannot be made. Both models will be discussed below.  
From Table 7, it can be seen that the RE model estimates that controlling for patient 
demographic factors and comorbidities, Quarters 1,2,6 and 8 represent statistically 
significant declines in the odds of having at least one separation in the specified quarter, 
relative to the odds of having at least one separation in Quarter 4 .  Odds ratios for 
Quarters 1,2,6 and 8 are 0.44, 0.46, 0.63 and 0.57 respectively. Thus, for Quarter 1 the 
odds of having at least one separation are 0.44 times the odds of having at least one 
separation in Quarter 4. As a result, a broad pattern is suggested where the odds of having 
at least one separation in a given quarter rise until Quarter 4, and then decline afterward, 
though in a non-consecutive manner. This general pattern is reflective of the descriptive 
statistics presented in Table 5, with respect to the quarter variable. Overall, although 
there is a downward trend noted in respect to the odds of having at least one separation 
in a quarter relative to Quarter 4 under nephrologist care, the pre-intervention trend must 
also be taken into account. In terms of patient demographic factors and comorbidities, all 
variables and interactions estimated were not statistically significant. Thus, no statistically 
significant relationships (or functional forms of these relationships) are able to be 
established, in relation to their effect on separation patterns.  
The FE model results for Quarters 5,6,7 and 8 do not show statistically significant changes 
in the odds of at least one separation in that quarter, relative to the odds of at least one 
separation in Quarter 4 after controlling for patient demographic factors and 
comorbidities. Appendix 3 shows the respective p-values for Table 7 – it can be seen that 
the p-values for Quarters 6 and 8 are significant at the 10% level but not the 5% level.   
The FE model shows statistically significant lower odds of at least one separation in 
Quarters 1 and 2, relative to the odds in Quarter 4. The odds ratios for Quarters 1 and 2 
and 0.45 and 0.46 respectively. Overall, the FE model is in agreement with the RE model of 
showing a broad trend of increasing odds of at least one separation in a given quarter in 
the pre-intervention period relative to the odds in Quarter 4. However, at the 5% 
significance level the FE model does not estimate statistically significant declines in the 
odds of having at least one separation under nephrologist care, relative to the odds in 
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Quarter 4. As expected, the FE model is not able to estimate the functional form or 
significance of any comorbidity interactions, as there is no within variation in the dataset. 
In reference to the time variable coding strategies considered in Table 2, a Wald test was 
performed on the null hypothesis that the coefficients in Quarters 5-8 were equal. The null 
hypothesis was rejected for both RE and FE models (Prob>chi^2 =0.0056 for RE and 
Prob>chi^2=0.02 for FE). Thus, modelling each quarter as a separate indicator variable was 
a reasonable tradeoff of increased flexibility in modelling the time trend, accepting a loss 
of parsimony as a consequence. 
7.2 DISCUSSION 
Despite broadening the scope of separations in the analysis to include those of all-cause, 
they were a rare event. Both the RE and FE model showed a trend of statistically 
significantly lower odds of at least one separation in Quarters 1 and 2 relative to the odds 
in Quarter 4. However, only the RE model showed a statistically significant decline in the 
odds of at least one separation in any post-intervention quarter, relative to the odds in 
Quarter 4. No statistically significant relationships were able to be established with 
regards to the interaction between CKD and either diabetes or cardiovascular disease.  A 
significant limitation of the model is a restricted timeframe, in which only one year pre-
intervention and post-interventions is studied. Clinical activities that the nephrologist 
undertakes with respect to medication changes or appropriate diagnostic tests may have 
consequences for the health of the patient that extend well beyond a single year of 
observation. This issue will be returned to in the Limitations section. 
Considering the output from the FE regression, this thesis proposes the presence of two 
different patient groups within the Registry dataset. The FE estimation removed 75 
patients from the sample due to all observations over 𝑖 being 0 or 1. Further examination 
of the dataset reveals 74 of those patients recorded zero separations. Considering the 
underlying process of consent into the Registry, it is reasonable to theorise these patients 
were referred to the outpatient nephrologist clinic through their GP. For the remaining 
patients – it is necessary to consider whether the presence of at least one separation in 
the pre-intervention year is incidental to their referral to an outpatient nephrologist clinic, 
or whether discharge instructions from a separation led to their consent into the Registry. 
An incidental argument would theorise that increasing odds of at least one separation in a 
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given quarter leading up to the consent date is indicative of a set of patients with 
increasing levels of ‘general ill health’. If not for nephrologist intervention, this trend of 
increasing odds may have continued – instead of the decline shown in the RE model. 
Without a control group, it is difficult to assess the merit of this argument. If discharge 
instructions from a separation directly contributed to consent into the Registry however, 
this would result in endogeneity.  In particular, reverse causality would occur in which a 
positive value of the binary dependent variable in one of the pre-intervention quarters 
would lead to consent into the Registry. To assess the validity of this argument, the 
following frequency table was constructed over all patients with at least one separation in 
the dataset, shown in Table 8.  
Table 8 Frequency Table - Separation Behaviour 
  Pre-Intervention   Post-Intervention 
  
Number of Patients with at Least One 
Separation in the Quarter  
Number of Patients with at Least One 
Separation in the Quarter 
Q1  34   Q5  67   
Q2  35   Q6  44   
Q3  45   Q7  47   
Q4  60   Q8  41   
  
Number of Quarters Containing at 
Least One Separation, by Patient  
Number of Quarters Containing at Least 
One Separation, by Patient 
0  58   0  43   
1  68   1  73   
2  27   2  36   
3  12   3  14   
4   4   4   3   
 
The top half of Table 8 contains a count of how many patients had at least one separation 
in a specified quarter. The lower half accounts for the number of times the same patient 
had at least one separation in multiple quarters, by tallying the overall number of quarters 
in the year registering a 1 in the dependent variable, by patient. Out of 169 patients 
observed, 126 patients had either zero or one quarter with at least one separation in the 
pre-intervention year. In the post-intervention year, 116 patients registered either zero or 
one quarter of at least one separation. As a result, drawing conclusions regarding the 
effect of nephrologist intervention on the probability of at least one separation in a given 
quarter is hindered by the rarity of the event in the first place.  However the largest 
number of patients admitted in the pre-intervention year were admitted in Quarter 4. 
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Further analysis also showed 28 patients who only had one quarter of at least one 
separation in the pre-intervention year had it in Quarter 4. It is necessary to establish 
whether this peak is representative of unrelated admissions, or whether the peak is 
directly linked with discharge instructions which recommend an outpatient nephrologist 
consultation. If discharge instructions recommended an outpatient nephrologist 
consultation, in order to match the patient’s consent date into the Registry the patient 
would have had to be able to obtain an appointment in under three months.  
Administrative data which tracks the referral waiting times for the Mackay outpatient 
nephrologist clinic would therefore offer substantial evidence as to the feasibility of a 
patient separated in Quarter 4 with discharge instructions having a consent date into the 
Registry which matches the dataset.   
The risk of endogeneity in the model is difficult to address, as the dataset did not contain 
any feasible instruments for this group of patients. A complication of the logit panel model 
and this particular research topic is that a dummy variable strategy cannot be employed in 
any manner that perfectly predicts the dependent variable. Moreover, the use of lagged 
values of the dependent variable are fraught, given the theory that nephrologist care 
represents a potential break in behaviour.  Furthermore, an implicit assumption of the 
previous models is that the likelihood of at least one separation in a quarter is not 
increased based on previous experiences of at least one separation in a given quarter. If 
values of 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 offer material explanatory power to future behaviour, then dynamic 
models should be considered (Baltagi 2008).  However the use of dynamic FE logit models 
requires strict exogeneity of explanatory variables (Baltagi 2008), which is unclear at this 
point. An aforementioned limitation of the model presented is the risk of one hospital stay 
containing multiple separations which cross over two quarters. Therefore, if the first lag of 
the dependent variable was found to have explanatory power, this is a clear candidate as 
an explanation.   
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8 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION – LOG TRANSFORMED QUARTERLY 
EXPENDITURE 
In the following chapter, the results of the log-transformed quarterly expenditure model 
are presented, along with relevant model specification and diagnostic tests. A discussion 
follows the presentation of results. The results are analysed with reference to the two 
relevant questions of interest; 
1. Is all-cause inpatient expenditure lower as a result of nephrologist care? 
2. Are statistically significant relationships able to be established regarding the 
interaction between CKD and comorbidities, with respect to their impact on 
expenditure? 
Table 9 (found below) is republished in Appendix 4, with all p-values listed. 
8.1 RESULTS – QH LOG-TRANSFORMED QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE 
Table 9 Log-Transformed Quarterly Expenditure - Model Comparison 
  Pooled OLS   RE FGLS   FE  (Within)   
       
Age -0.022 *** -0.022 *** 0.105  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.255)  
       
Sex_F -0.303  -0.303  0  
 (0.156)  (0.156)  (.)  
       
eGFR -0.015 ** -0.015 ** 0  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (.)  
       
Diabetes -0.242  -0.242  0  
 (0.464)  (0.464)  (.)  
       
CVD -0.289  -0.289  0  
 (0.327)  (0.327)  (.)  
       
Diabetes*eGFR -0.001  -0.001  0  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (.)  
       
CVD*eGFR 0.019 ** 0.019 ** 0  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (.)  
       
Diabetes*CVD 0.318  0.318  0  
 (0.339)  (0.339)  (.)  
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Quarter_1 -0.010  -0.010  0.114  
 (0.356)  (0.356)  (0.490)  
       
Quarter_2 0.000  0.000  0.114  
 (0.290)  (0.290)  (0.360)  
       
Quarter_3 0.106  0.106  -0.092  
 (0.248)  (0.248)  (0.319)  
       
Quarter_5 -0.043  -0.043  -0.228  
 (0.214)  (0.214)  (0.245)  
       
Quarter_6 -0.554 * -0.554 * -0.595 * 
 (0.217)  (0.217)  (0.294)  
       
Quarter_7 -0.406  -0.406  -0.612  
 (0.256)  (0.256)  (0.348)  
       
Quarter_8 -0.071  -0.071  -0.515  
 (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.337)  
       
_cons 10.608 *** 10.608 *** 2.050  
 (0.543)  (0.543)  (16.400)  
              
sigma_u   0  1.815  
sigma_e   1.291  1.291  
Prob>F 0.000       0.531   
Prob>chi2   0.000    
R-Squared 0.1190  0.1192  0.0002  
N 373   373   373   
 
1Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
2Significance: *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
In terms of model selection, the FE model does not reject the F test that all regressor 
coefficients are jointly zero. Thus, this model is eliminated from further analysis. The 
Lagrange Multiplier test does not reject the null hypothesis (p=1.00), therefore pooled OLS 
is the preferred model. While both the RE and FE models were severely unbalanced (the 
average number of observations across individuals was 2.2), a selection of the pooled OLS 
model with cluster-robust standard errors avoids a requirement for unbalanced panel 
analysis.  
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The pooled model results for the quarter variables show that conditional on positive 
expenditure and controlling for patient demographic and comorbidity factors, patients in 
Quarter 6 have a ratio of approximately 0.57 in terms of their expected geometric mean of 
quarterly expenditure divided by the expected geometric mean of quarterly expenditure 
in Quarter 4. However the remaining post-intervention quarters do not have statistically 
significantly different coefficients from the base quarter of Quarter 4. This result is broadly 
in line with the descriptive statistics stated in Table 6, which did not show a clear trend. 
Thus, an isolated quarter of lower quarterly expenditure followed by two quarters where 
expenditure is not significantly different from Quarter 4 provides little indication that 
future periods will replicate what was shown to have occurred in Quarter 6. 
With respect to the comorbidity variables, a one year increase in age is associated with an 
approximately 2.2% decline in quarterly expenditure, controlling over all other patient and 
comorbidity factors, and controlling over time. The direction of this relationship is in line 
with Honeycutt et al. (2013)’s results, though Honeycutt et al. used a GLM model in the 
second half of their two-part model. Honeycutt et al. also found a negative association 
between females and conditional expenditure at the 5% significance level, while the 
model above found this relationship to be significant at the 10% level (p=0.053). Finally, 
Honeycutt et al. found a positive relationship between diabetes and conditional 
expenditure to be significant at the 5% level, whereas the pooled model estimated does 
not find any significant relationship when diabetes is estimated separately or in an 
interaction term with eGFR or cardiovascular disease. In terms of comorbidities, eGFR is 
estimated separately, as well as interacted with both diabetes and cardiovascular disease. 
As a result, controlling for time and patient demographic factors, for patients without 
diabetes or cardiovascular disease an increase in eGFR of one unit is associated with 
approximately 1.5% decline in quarterly expenditure. However with reference to the 
research questions listed in the beginning of this chapter, the interaction term 𝐶𝑉𝐷 ∗
𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅  returned a statistically significant result at the 1% level. After controlling for eGFR 
and cardiovascular disease separately, and controlling for patient demographic factors and 
time across the model, as eGFR increases there is a statistically significant difference seen 
in log-transformed quarterly expenditure for patients with cardiovascular disease, relative 
to patients without cardiovascular disease.  As renal function declines, this difference is 
narrowed. 
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8.2 DISCUSSION 
The following plot is provided of the log-transformed QH quarterly expenditure values in 
the dataset and eGFR.  
 
Figure 6 Quarterly Expenditure by eGFR and CVD Status 
It can be seen in Figure 6 that as kidney function improves, the difference in log-
transformed quarterly expenditure widens for patients who have cardiovascular disease 
as opposed to patients who do not. However there are several issues of note shown in the 
diagram. Firstly, only one data point was estimated at an eGFR of less than 
13mL/min/1.73m2/year. This is a consequence of only considering conditional 
expenditure. As a result, positing that this relationship exists for patients with Stage 5 CKD 
(eGFR < 15mL/min/1.73m2/year) inherently involves a measure of extrapolation. The 
relationship between QH expenditure, Stage 5 CKD and cardiovascular disease is therefore 
a future research topic of interest with a patient sample that contains higher numbers of 
Stage 5 patients. Secondly, there is a mass of predictions at an eGFR of 91. Returning to 
the dataset, 10.2% of the patient sample had an eGFR of 91. It is not able to be 
ascertained whether an administrative process censored the eGFR variable from above at 
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91mL/min/1.73m2, however this possibility requires investigation because censoring of a 
regressor produces biased estimates.  A potential method of dealing with censored 
regressors is removing the cases in which censoring occurs, however this introduces the 
prospect of bias due to truncation (Rigobon & Stoker 2006). The results of that regression 
in the pooled model are found in Appendix 6, where the interaction term is no longer 
statistically significant. Given that patients with an eGFR of >91mL/min/1.73m2/year are 
classed as having Stage 1 disease, another alternative model was estimated removing 
eGFR as a continuous variable and combining Stages 1-3b and Stages 4-5 into a single 
indicator variable for Stage 4-5. This specification was selected order to preserve 
parsimony, as the sample size is small and the CKD variable is estimated separately and in 
two interaction terms.  This model specification is discussed further in Appendix 7, 
however the general trend was preserved of the difference in log-transformed quarterly 
expenditure observed between patients with cardiovascular disease and patients without 
narrowing as CKD worsens.  Rigobon & Stoker (2006) detail econometric methods which 
may be used to investigate this issue in the QH-CKD.QLD Registry dataset in future 
research.  
In order to determine how well the pooled OLS model performed at predicting quarterly 
expenditure, diagnostic testing of residuals was carried out for the retransformation 
process. The results are provided in Appendix 5. All three heteroscedasticity tests did not 
reject the null hypothesis of constant variance. The sktest rejected the null hypothesis of a 
normal distribution (Prob>chi^2= 0.019). Thus, Duan’s smearing estimator was employed 
to estimate fitted values of the equation. Figure 7 provided below plots observed 
quarterly expenditure values compared to the predicted values from the estimated pooled 
OLS regression. The plot is specified such that the y and x axis gradations are identical. 
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It can be seen in  Figure 7 that the pooled OLS estimation of quarterly expenditure is not 
accurately predicting resource use in highest expenditure patients. The estimated 
regression does not predict QH quarterly expenditure above a value of $30,441, whereas 
10% of the observed QH expenditure values are above this threshold. For the purposes of 
budgeting and determining baseline calculations of expenditure use in CKD patients, 
accurate prediction of the highest-cost decile would be of paramount importance.  
8.3 SUMMARY 
As a result of the model selection process, the pooled OLS model was considered to be the 
most econometrically sound. Only a single post-intervention period (Quarter 6) was 
shown to have statistically significantly lowered log-transformed expenditure, relative to 
the base period of Quarter 4. Given Quarter 6 was immediately followed by two quarters 
of non-statistical significance, it would not be reasonable to project any reduction in 
expenditure in future periods with the information known at present. While a statistically 
significant interaction was estimated for 𝐶𝑉𝐷 ∗ 𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅 , the weight of observations at an 
eGFR of 91 invites concern that the eGFR value has been censored from above as a result 
of an administrative process.   
Figure 7 Observed vs. Predicted QH Quarterly Expenditure: 45 Degree Perfect Prediction 
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9 CONCLUSION 
This concluding chapter will provide a brief summary of the estimated results, in the 
context of the research questions of interest presented in the introductory chapter. 
Recommendations for future data collection methods will then be presented in light of 
issues encountered during the research phase. Major limitations of the study will be 
discussed, and final remarks will conclude the chapter.  
9.1 KEY FINDINGS 
 This thesis sought to investigate the separation and expenditure patterns of CKD patients 
who were referred to an outpatient nephrology clinic in Mackay between July 2012 and 
June 2015. The research questions of interest were; 
1) Are patients separated from hospital less frequently as a result of nephrologist 
care? 
2) Is all-cause inpatient expenditure lower as a result of nephrologist care? 
3) Are statistically significant relationships able to be established regarding the 
interaction between CKD and comorbidities, with respect to their impact on 
separation and expenditure patterns? 
With respect to the first and third question, both RE and FE logit models estimated 
reduced odds of ‘at least one separation in a quarter’ in Quarter 1 and Quarter 2, in 
comparison to the odds of at least one separation in Quarter 4, after controlling for 
patient demographic and comorbidity factors. However only the RE logit model estimated 
two quarters in the year after nephrologist intervention in which a statistically significant 
decline was seen in the odds of at least one separation, compared to the odds in Quarter 
4. These two quarters were non-consecutive. The FE model did not estimate any 
statistically significant differences in the odds of at least one separation in any post-
intervention quarter compared to the odds in Quarter 4. All comorbidity terms (including 
interaction terms) were statistically insignificant for both FE and RE models. Thus, this 
thesis is able to provide evidence of a temporary effect of a decline in the odds of at least 
one separation in a given quarter in the post-intervention year using the RE model. 
However this needs to be contextualised by the fact that separations were rare in the 
dataset. A key issue of reverse causality is raised in this analysis, due to the suspicion that 
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‘at least one separation in a given quarter’ in the pre-intervention year causes referral into 
the Registry. Suggestions for future data collection methods to address this issue are 
provided below.   
With respect to the second and third question, the pooled OLS model only estimated one 
3-month period in the year after nephrologist intervention in which statistically 
significantly lower log-transformed expenditure was recorded, relative to the expenditure 
recorded in Quarter 4. As a result, this thesis can only produce one quarter of evidence in 
support of the second research question.  This is not considered sufficient for drawing 
conclusions regarding an overall trend. The interaction term 𝐶𝑉𝐷 ∗ 𝑒𝐺𝐹𝑅 was statistically 
significant at the 1% level. As eGFR increases, the difference between estimated log-
transformed quarterly expenditure for patients who have cardiovascular disease widens in 
comparison to patients without cardiovascular disease. However the possibility of eGFR 
values being censored from above complicates this assertion, and future research should 
be directed towards clarifying this relationship. 
9.2 CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
Avenues for econometric analysis of comorbidity variables were hampered by a lack of 
within variation in the patient data, and a theoretical justification for fixed effects. More 
importantly, a lack of comorbidity variables which changed over time prevented the use of 
a Hausman test to make a determination of model preference, with respect to 
comorbidities as the primary variables of interest. There are multiple ways that within 
variation could be captured for the comorbidities in the dataset, which would greatly 
expand the econometric methods available for future researchers. Firstly, collecting eGFR 
values that are generated from inpatient pathology requests would allow direct 
estimation of the impact of a decline in eGFR on inpatient separation and expenditure 
patterns. It would also allow an expanded timeframe to be analysed before and after 
nephrologist intervention, as the eGFR value would be reflecting the current state of the 
patient. Similarly, for the diabetes indicator variable this thesis suggests HbA1c scores 
(also obtained from routine pathology requests) are a candidate as a time-varying 
measure of a patient’s diabetic control. The cardiovascular disease indicator variable 
contains a diffuse collection of diseases – a suitable time-varying measure is less clear in 
this circumstance. Finally, this thesis recommends two administrative variables for registry 
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datasets of this type. Firstly, an indication of the origin of the patient’s referral would aid 
econometric analysis in an initial partitioning of the data between patients referred by 
GP’s and referrals generated out of episodes of tertiary care.  The ability to link a referral 
to a particular separation would be immensely informative. Secondly, if it is unavoidable 
that particular regressors are censored at the time of consent into a registry, a free text 
response box detailing the circumstances of this censoring process would allow the 
researcher to make informed decisions about the best way to proceed.  
Another possible expansion of the QH dataset would be to include administrative records 
of outpatient consultations during this time. The QH dataset currently contains 
expenditure associated with inpatient separations. Hence, it was not able to track the 
number of outpatient appointments that patients had with the nephrologist. Higher 
intensity users of outpatient nephrologist services represent a reallocation of time and 
resources toward a particular patient. Information related to patterns of expenditure in 
these patients would be of value to QH and nephrologists if a large enough longitudinal 
dataset were able to be created. In this way, an analysis could be made of QH expenditure 
on outpatient services, QH expenditure on inpatient services and the clinical trajectory of 
patient groups stratified by their use of outpatient nephrologist services.  
9.3 LIMITATIONS 
9.3.1 Timeframe of Analysis 
A central difficulty with the research questions of interest in this thesis is the fact that 
clinical interventions performed by a nephrologist may impact the commodity of ‘good 
health’ in the patient for many years into the future. Consequently, analysing changes in 
separation and expenditure patterns one year either side of nephrologist referral may not 
represent the true impact of the intervention. Patient clinical outcomes could not be 
observed and were out of scope for analysis. Thus, longitudinal datasets which track 
clinical outcomes for patients under nephrologist care versus a control group provide an 
excellent source of information for econometric analysis. This approach is commonly 
undertaken in the empirical literature, as discussed in Chapter 4. However, a critical 
analysis needs to be applied to the appropriateness of associating patient outcomes long-
term with nephrologist intervention. Lane et al. (2016) noted that 15% of patients in their 
study only saw the nephrologist once before being referred back to their GP, and 35% had 
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been referred back by the 6 month mark. Thus, attributing outcomes to nephrologist 
intervention spanning years into the future requires significant care in the study design, to 
account for idiosyncratic patient factors in the intervening years. 
9.3.2 Omitted Variables 
A cross-check of Kidney Health Australia’s referral guidelines against the descriptive 
statistics of the patients in the sample showed approximately 70% of patients had eGFR’s 
>30mL/min/1.73m2/year. Kidney Health Australia’s referral guidelines recommend that 
(KHA 2015, p.20);  
In the absence of other referral indicators, referral is not necessary if: 
 Stable eGFR >30mL/min/1.73m2 
 Urine albumin creatinine ratio <30mg/mmol (with no haematuria) 
 Controlled blood pressure  
 
 As a result, it is reasonable to suspect omitted variable bias may be present in the model 
estimations. eGFR alone is clearly not sufficient to explain the underlying disparity 
between the referral guidelines and the patient characteristics of observed referrals. This 
issue is particularly emphasised for patient suspected of having their eGFR censored from 
above. A clear candidate for inclusion in any future studies of this type is measures of 
proteinuria or albuminuria, given their effect on clinical guidelines and their recognised 
predictive capacity for patient outcomes (KHA 2015; Johnson et al. 2012).   
The other major source of omitted variable bias in the dataset is the fact that the QH 
expenditure model accommodates loadings for certain patient/treatment categories 
including Indigenous status and remoteness classification (Department of Health 2013).  
Although a consistent loading applied to expenditure would be able to be estimated with 
the relevant patient variable, loadings are subject to change across the timeframe of the 
dataset. 
9.3.3 Queensland Health Funding Model Changes 
The dataset under analysis utilised QH expenditure figures from 2011-2016. During this 
time, a number of bureaucratic changes were made to the funding model, which 
introduce validity concerns comparing figures obtained across multiple financial years. For 
example, in the ‘Health Funding Principles and Guidelines 2013-14’ document it is stated 
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that the payment model described in Figure 3 has been introduced for the 2013-14 
financial year to replace ‘percentile methodology’ (Department of Health 2013, p.18). 
Furthermore, the Indigenous loading changed from 30% in 2012-13 to 4% in 2013-14 
(Department of Health 2013).  Further analysis in this area may require comprehensive 
administrative research to establish a level of standardisation across the timeframe 
studied.  
9.3.4 Private Health Insurance Status 
QH did not provide expenditure information for separations in which the patient elected 
to be admitted privately. Patterns of expenditure22 in this subset of patients would be of 
particular economic interest, due to the opportunity to compare outcomes based on the 
different remuneration structures for the nephrologist involved. A second related 
limitation which cannot be resolved is the possibility of Registry patients being admitted 
to private hospitals, for which patient-linked data is not available. The Registry did not 
provide information regarding which patients held private health insurance at the time of 
consent; as a result it is difficult to quantify the potential magnitude of this concern. Both 
examples result in a downward bias in the estimation of all-cause inpatient expenditure 
for CKD patients in the wider health system, as the federal government and private health 
insurers would contribute in these cases. However, given that QH receives revenue from 
treating private patients in a public hospital, it would be of interest to incorporate these 
figures to have a clearer picture of resource use. Finally, although patients were excluded 
from analysis if they had solely privately coded separations, patients who recorded a 
mixture of public and private separations remained in the dataset. This decision was made 
on consistency grounds; only separations which had expenditures attached could be 
included for analysis and that any public separation represented information of interest to 
QH. Excluding patients from analysis who recorded at least one private separation creates 
a theoretical risk of selection bias, particularly on the basis of unobserved socioeconomic 
status. 
                                                        
22 The National Health Reform Agreement 2011 states, “An eligible patient presenting at a public hospital 
emergency department will be treated as a public patient, before any clinical decision to admit. On 
admission, the patient will be given the choice to elect to be a public or private patient in accordance with 
the National Standards for Public Hospital Admitted Patient Election processes…” (Council of Australian 
Governments 2011, pp.59). Thus - admitting doctors have limited information with regards to the financial 
incentives involved in the decision to admit a patient. 
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9.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is vital to understand the cost-effectiveness of treatments which aim to slow the 
progression of CKD towards ESRD. For a state healthcare system, outpatient nephrologist 
consultations represent a unique opportunity for intervention, given the level of control 
they have over the supply of public nephrologists, and hence the supply of outpatient 
nephrologist consultations. Given the Queensland resident’s dual role as a taxpayer and a 
patient, an expectation is in place that Queensland Health will pursue interventions that 
prioritise the public good, as well as reduce the potential future healthcare expenditure 
burden. Health economists have a wide scope for analysis in this area, in terms of 
characterising the separation and expenditure patterns for CKD patients who are treated 
by public nephrologists. Through a combination of rigorous econometric analysis and 
quality medical research regarding patient outcomes, it is hoped that there are research 
breakthroughs on the horizon which utilise the medical expertise of public nephrologists 
to deliver the greatest benefits to Queensland. 
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APPENDIX 1 – KIDNEY HEALTH AUSTRALIA DIAGNOSTIC ALGORITHM
 
 
Figure 8 Diagnostic Algorithm for CKD (KHA 2015 p.19) 
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APPENDIX 2 – RANDOM EFFECTS LOGIT QUADRATURE CHECK 
  Fitted Comparison Comparison     
 Quadrature Quadrature Quadrature   
  12 points 8 points 16 points     
      
Log likelihood          -885.780950 -885.781600 -885.780960   
  -0.000647 -0.000010 Difference 
  0.000001 0.000000 Relative difference 
      
Age 0.001640 0.001640 0.001640   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 -0.000002 Relative difference 
      
Sex_F -0.169857 -0.169857 -0.169857   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000000 Relative difference 
      
eGFR -0.003121 -0.003121 -0.003121   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
Diabetes -0.406849 -0.406849 -0.406850   
  0.000000 -0.000001 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000003 Relative difference 
      
CVD 0.090513 0.090513 0.090514   
  0.000000 0.000001 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000010 Relative difference 
      
Diabetes*eGFR 0.002544 0.002544 0.002544   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000002 Relative difference 
      
CVD*eGFR 0.005884 0.005884 0.005884   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
Diabetes*CVD 0.706377 0.706377 0.706379   
  0.000000 0.000001 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000002 Relative difference 
      
Quarter_1 -0.819068 -0.819068 -0.819069   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
Quarter_2 -0.780850 -0.780850 -0.780850   
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  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
Quarter_3 -0.432993 -0.432993 -0.432994   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
Quarter_5 0.178834 0.178834 0.178834   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
Quarter_6 -0.466412 -0.466412 -0.466412   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
Quarter_7 -0.371796 -0.371796 -0.371796   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
Quarter_8 -0.566836 -0.566836 -0.566837   
  0.000000 0.000000 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
_cons -1.496885 -1.496885 -1.496886   
  0.000000 -0.000001 Difference 
  0.000000 0.000001 Relative difference 
      
/lnsig2u -0.032426 -0.032426 -0.032422   
  0.000000 0.000004 Difference 
    0.000000 -0.000120 Relative difference 
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APPENDIX 3 – PANEL LOGIT MODEL COMPARISON 
 
  Pooled Logit   RE Logit   FE Logit   
           
Age 0.002   0.002   0.029   
  (0.683)   (0.822)   (0.904)   
           
Sex_F -0.166   -0.170   0   
  (0.336)   (0.386)   (.)   
           
eGFR -0.003   -0.003   0   
  (0.505)   (0.575)   (.)   
           
Diabetes -0.299   -0.407   0   
  (0.605)   (0.534)   (.)   
           
CVD 0.010   0.091   0   
  (0.984)   (0.863)   (.)   
           
Diabetes*eGFR 0.002   0.003   0   
  (0.867)   (0.819)   (.)   
           
CVD*eGFR 0.006   0.006   0   
  (0.501)   (0.546)   (.)   
           
Diabetes*CVD 0.602   0.706   0   
  (0.144)   (0.134)   (.)   
           
Quarter_1 -0.713 ** -0.819 ** -0.800 * 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.013)   
           
Quarter_2 -0.680 ** -0.781 ** -0.77 ** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
           
Quarter_3 -0.374   -0.433   -0.427   
  (0.059)   (0.058)   (0.067)   
           
Quarter_5 0.153   0.179   0.172   
  (0.415)   (0.414)   (0.448)   
           
Quarter_6 -0.404 * -0.466 * -0.482   
  (0.048)   (0.047)   (0.067)   
           
Quarter_7 -0.322   -0.372   -0.393   
  (0.131)   (0.132)   (0.209)   
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Quarter_8 -0.493 * -0.567 * -0.595   
  (0.023)   (0.024)   (0.086)   
           
_cons -1.297 * -1.497 *                    
  (0.016)   (0.021)                      
           
/lnsig2u     -0.0324       
     (0.881)      
           
LR Test      0.000       
Prob>chi^2 0.0000   0.0000   0.0279   
Pseudo R-sq 0.033      0.028   
AIC 1870.2   1805.6   997.4   
BIC 1959.4   1900.3   1039   
Log-Likelihood -919.1   -885.8   -490.7   
N 1944   1944   1344   
 
1 P-values provided below coefficient estimations in parentheses. 
2 Significance: *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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APPENDIX 4 – LOG-TRANSFORMED QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
  RE FGLS   
FE  
(Within) 
  
       
Age -0.022 *** -0.022 *** 0.105  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.682)  
       
Sex_F -0.303  -0.303  0  
 (0.053)  (0.052)  (.)  
       
eGFR -0.015 ** -0.015 ** 0  
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (.)  
       
Diabetes -0.242  -0.242  0  
 (0.603)  (0.602)  (.)  
       
CVD -0.289  -0.289  0  
 (0.379)  (0.378)  (.)  
       
Diabetes*eGFR -0.001  -0.001  0  
 (0.881)  (0.881)  (.)  
       
CVD*eGFR 0.019 ** 0.019 ** 0  
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (.)  
       
Diabetes*CVD 0.318  0.318  0  
 (0.350)  (0.348)  (.)  
       
Quarter_1 -0.010  -0.010  0.114  
 (0.978)  (0.978)  (0.816)  
       
Quarter_2 0.000  0.000  0.114  
 (0.999)  (0.999)  (0.753)  
       
Quarter_3 0.106  0.106  -0.092  
 (0.669)  (0.668)  (0.773)  
       
Quarter_5 -0.044  -0.043  -0.228  
 (0.840)  (0.839)  (0.353)  
       
Quarter_6 -0.554 * -0.554 * -0.595 * 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.045)  
       
Quarter_7 -0.406  -0.406  -0.612  
 (0.114)  (0.112)  (0.081)  
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Quarter_8 -0.071  -0.071  -0.515  
 (0.760)  (0.760)  (0.128)  
       
_cons 10.608 *** 10.608 *** 2.050  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.901)  
              
sigma_u   0  1.815  
sigma_e   1.291  1.291  
Prob>F 0.000       0.531   
Prob>chi2   0.000    
R-Squared 0.1190  0.1192  0.0002  
N 373   373   373   
 
1 P-values provided below coefficient estimations in parentheses. 
2 Significance: *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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APPENDIX 5 – QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE MODEL RETRANSFORMATION 
DIAGNOSTICS 
Heteroscedasticity Results 
 Prob>chi^2 
Test#1: hettest, ?̂? = 𝑧 0.288 
Test#2: hettest, iid ?̂? = 𝑧 0.3626 
Test#3: hettest, iid 𝑥 = 𝑧 0.0849 
 
Residual Plot 
 
 
Kernel Density Estimate 
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APPENDIX 6 – QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE MODEL: EXCLUSION OF EGFR 
CASES=91ML/MIN/1.73M2/YR 
 
  
Pooled 
OLS  
Age -0.026 *** 
 (0.000)  
   
Sex_F -0.219  
 (0.189)  
   
eGFR -0.020 ** 
 (0.001)  
   
Diabetes -0.563  
 (0.256)  
   
CVD -0.088  
 (0.799)  
   
Diabetes*eGFR 0.008  
 (0.349)  
   
CVD*eGFR 0.013  
 (0.107)  
   
Diabetes*CVD 0.363  
 (0.306)  
   
Quarter_1 -0.018  
 (0.960)  
   
Quarter_2 -0.046  
 (0.880)  
   
Quarter_3 0.088  
 (0.747)  
   
Quarter_5 -0.118  
 (0.589)  
   
Quarter_6 -0.534 * 
 (0.020)  
   
Quarter_7 -0.403  
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 (0.141)  
   
Quarter_8 -0.052  
 -0.835  
   
_cons 11.001 *** 
 (0.000)  
    
Prob>F 0.000  
R-Squared 0.1057  
N 344  
 
1 P-values provided below coefficient estimations in parentheses. 
2 Significance: *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
89 
 
APPENDIX 7– QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE MODEL: ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
SPECIFICATION 
Results are provided below in Table 10.  
Table 10 QH Log-Transformed Quarterly Expenditure Alternate Specification 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
  RE FGLS   
FE  
(Within) 
  
       
Age -0.017 *** -0.017 *** 0.105  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.255)  
       
Sex_F -0.291  -0.288  0  
 (0.164)  (0.164)  (.)  
       
CKD_Stage4&5 0.762 ** 0.765 ** 0  
 (0.267)  (0.269)  (.)  
       
Diabetes -0.354  -0.351  0  
 (0.270)  (0.272)  (.)  
       
CVD 0.815 *** 0.812 *** 0  
 (0.235)  (0.235)  (.)  
       
Diabetes*CKD_Stage4&5 -0.096  -0.101  0  
 (0.290)  (0.291)  (.)  
       
CVD*CKD_Stage4&5 -0.796 ** -0.797 ** 0  
 (0.297)  (0.299)  (.)  
       
Diabetes*CVD 0.401  0.403  0  
 (0.317)  (0.318)  (.)  
       
Quarter_1 0.001  0.001  0.114  
 (0.350)  (0.349)  (0.490)  
       
Quarter_2 0.029  0.026  0.114  
 (0.294)  (0.293)  (0.360)  
       
Quarter_3 0.086  0.084  -0.092  
 (0.253)  (0.252)  (0.319)  
       
Quarter_5 -0.028  -0.030  -0.228  
 (0.214)  (0.214)  (0.245)  
       
Quarter_6 -0.544 * -0.545 * -0.595 * 
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 (0.222)  (0.221)  (0.294)  
       
Quarter_7 -0.394  -0.396  -0.612  
 (0.255)  (0.255)  (0.348)  
       
Quarter_8 -0.079  -0.084  -0.515  
 (0.231)  (0.231)  (0.337)  
       
_cons 9.322 *** 9.302 *** 2.05  
 (0.350)  (0.351)  (16.400)  
              
sigma_u   0.155  1.815  
sigma_e   1.291  1.291  
Prob>F 0.000       0.531   
Prob>chi2   0.000    
R-Squared 0.1104  0.1104  0.0002  
N 373   373   373   
 
1Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
2Significance: *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 Similarly to the original specification, an F-test rejects the FE model and the Lagrange-
Multiplier test does not reject the null hypothesis of nil random effects 
(Prob>chi^2=0.2645).  Thus, the pooled OLS model was the preferred model for analysis. 
For the time quarter variables, controlling for patient demographic factors and 
comorbidities, under nephrologist care only Quarter 6 showed statistically significantly 
lower log-transformed quarterly expenditure in comparison to Quarter 4. As a result, the 
alternate model specification is consistent with the original model specification in its 
conclusion that QH quarterly expenditure is not significantly lower under nephrologist 
care in a manner that represents an ongoing trend.  
In terms of comorbidities, controlling for patient demographic factors and time CKD stage 
4&5 is associated with a ratio of 2.14 in terms of the mean geometric quarterly 
expenditure divided by the mean geometric quarterly expenditure for patients with Stage 
1-3b CKD. Controlling for time and patient demographic factors, as a separate effect 
patients with cardiovascular disease have a ratio of 2.26 in terms of the geometric mean 
of their quarterly expenditure divided by the geometric mean of quarterly expenditure for 
patients without cardiovascular disease. The interaction term in this model however has a 
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negative effect on the estimation of quarterly expenditure, which is statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  
A plot of observed log-transformed quarterly expenditure by CKD Stage and 
cardiovascular disease status is provided below in Figure 9. As expected, there is a 
significant loss of information attached to the model specification of CKD Stage 4&5 as an 
indicator variable, as opposed to eGFR as a continuous variable. Similar to the original 
specification, the difference in expenditure for patients with cardiovascular disease as 
opposed to patients without cardiovascular disease narrows as kidney function declines. 
 
Figure 9 Log-Transformed Quarterly Expenditure by CKD Stage and Cardiovascular Disease Status 
Heteroscedasticity Results 
 Prob>chi^2 
Test#1: hettest, ?̂? = 𝑧 0.4494 
Test#2: hettest, iid ?̂? = 𝑧 0.5110 
Test#3: hettest, iid 𝑥 = 𝑧 0.1168 
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Residual Plot 
 
 
Kernel Density Estimate 
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Retransformation was performed using Duan’s smearing estimator, as all three tests of 
constant variance did not reject the null hypothesis and sktest rejected the null hypothesis 
of normality. The plot below of observed QH quarterly expenditure values shows the same 
issues as the original specification, where the predicted quarterly expenditure values able 
to be estimated by the regression model do not capture the high quarterly expenditure 
quarters observed.  
 
Figure 10 Observed vs. Predicted Quarterly Expenditure - Alternate Model Specification 
 
